HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XLIV JANUARY, 1951 NUMBER 1

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

ERLAND EHNMARK

LUND UNIVERSITY

IN THE Platonic Phaedo, just as Socrates has closed his long speech with the sublime words about the journey of the soul after death, and its ultimate goal, Crito, his old friend — who does not seem to understand very much of the higher aspects of the matter, but is the more versed in worldly affairs, somewhat abruptly breaks the serene atmosphere with some practical questions, among them in what manner Socrates wishes to be buried. After his wont, Socrates answers, alike courteously and ambiguously, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me, and I do not escape from you." He adds, with a smile, that he cannot convince Crito that he is the Socrates who is then conversing with his friends, and who will not remain after having drunk the poison. "Crito," he says, "thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury *me*. But that which I some time since argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console both you and myself. Be ye then my sureties to Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges; for he undertook that I should remain; but do you be sureties that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may more easily bear it, and when he sees my body either burnt or buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if *I* suffered some dreadful thing, nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried." It is improper to speak of Socrates' dead body as if it were Socrates himself.[1]

We need not discuss the question whether this view pertains to the historical Socrates or only to Plato. It is sufficient here to

[1] Phaedo 115 C sq.; Cary's translation (Everyman's Library).

notice that according to this opinion personality is exclusively bound up with the soul, which in its turn is conceived of as something entirely distinct from the body. With this we may contrast the very opening words of the Iliad, where it is said that the wrath of Achilles sent the souls of many brave warriors to Hades, while they themselves were made the prey of dogs and birds. This implies, as has often been remarked, that the body is man himself, the (surviving) soul being regarded merely as a shadow. Thus what we call personality in the broadest sense of the word — the intellectual, moral, and emotional self — is so intimately connected with the body that it has no separate existence apart from it.

As is well known, Homer's conception of the soul closely resembles that of so-called primitive peoples. The essential thing is that a plurality of souls is commonly assumed; or perhaps rather a duality: one or more souls accounting for man's mental activities, just as is the case with the *phrenes* or the *thymos* in Homer; another soul, precisely the "ghost" as opposed to the "soul," representing the soul that survives, the Homeric *psyche*. Now this surviving soul generally has nothing to do with the personality of the living man. The souls that function during life as animating principles of the body are sharply distinguished from the immaterial soul, the alter ego which scarcely exists at all save when the subject is either unconscious or dead. The distinction is made clear also by the fact that the former category of souls are often identified with bodily organs — which is the case with the *phrenes*, the midriff — and are consequently extinguished with the body. The surviving image-soul (*Bildseele*), on the other hand, is psychologically speaking nothing but the recollection of the dead man; hence it has some sort of outward form but no real existence — Hades is the land of shadows.[2]

There are perhaps few of us who will vindicate, as consistently as did Socrates, the absolute value of the soul and the utter worthlessness of the body. We may, theoretically at least, accept the former part of the proposition, but at all events in practice, we will scarcely assent to the latter, though this would only be the

[2] For references, see my paper on The Idea of Immortality in Greek Religion, Eranos XLVI, 1948, p. 5 sq. I have drawn here on this paper where the Greek material is somewhat more fully treated.

logical consequence. And here it would not be amiss to dwell for a moment on the complexity of our own ideas. The second day of November has of old the name of All Souls' Day, *commemoratio omnium defunctorum*. Here the word "soul" has its original significance: it does not denote either vital principle or personality; it means the surviving part of man. The same holds true of the corresponding German word "Seele," which from the beginning denotes the disembodied spirit after death, the "image-soul," and not the psychic personality of the living man; the latter connotation seems to a large extent to be due to Luther's translation of the Bible.[3] The distinction now made between the English words "soul" and "ghost" is thus a fairly modern one.

It is true that most people in our day who believe in immortality are probably of the opinion that the soul — in the sense of the personality — alone survives, and know for certain that the body decays in the grave. Nevertheless, if we were to judge from their actions exclusively, it would scarcely seem quite correct to describe their real views in such a way. To take an instance from my own country, the Catholic custom of adorning the graves on All Souls' Day never became really current in Sweden, mainly owing to the fact that in old Scandinavian tradition the feast of the dead was celebrated at Christmas. In recent times, however, All *Saints'* Day — which is celebrated on the first of November or on the following Sunday — has more and more acquired the character of a memorial day for the departed, and certain customs attached to graves and graveyards have become ever more widely spread, for instance special Masses in the churchyard, and the adorning of the graves on this day. This development is the more remarkable in a Protestant country, and to an unprejudiced observer it would undoubtedly suggest the inference that to the living faith the "soul" is in reality the dead man himself, and that the dead are supposed to live in their graves. Why else should some of them be buried still wearing their wedding-rings? And doubtless this idea is present; but it is not the sole idea, or not even the central idea. There is always a risk in drawing inferences from man's behavior as to his ideas. To take another instance, it is often supposed that

[3] Cf. E. Arbman in Le Monde Oriental XXI, 1927, p. 183.

cremation is based on a conception of immortality different from that which underlies the custom of burial. But this does certainly not hold true in modern civilization — even those who believe in bodily resurrection may be adherents of cremation.

In reality, the situation is still more complex. We think of our dead relations just as they walked about when still alive; we cannot represent them otherwise than in a concrete form moulded upon recollection — this is obviously something akin to the "image-soul." We go to their graves and in a way imagine ourselves to be nearer them there, because we cannot refrain from associating them with their bodily remains and with the place where these are resting. At the same time we may be convinced that, as incorporeal souls, they lead quite another kind of life beyond space and time, "far from this world of toil and strife," "not fettered now by fleshly bonds," just as, in Charlotte Brontë's novel, Jane Eyre thinks that the spirit of Mr. Reed "might quit his abode — whether in the church vault or in the unknown world of the departed" (ch. II). In exactly the same sense Hamlet addresses the spectre of his father:

> Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd,
> Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell . . .
> Let me not burst in ignorance; but tell
> Why thy canonized bones, hearsed in death,
> Have burst their cerements; why the sepulchre,
> Wherein we saw thee quietly inurn'd,
> Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws,
> To cast thee up again. What may this mean,
> That thou, dead corse, again, in complete steel,
> Revisit'st thus the glimpses of the moon. . . .
>
> (Act I, Sc. 4)

Spooks are naturally the best modern instances of the image-soul or ghost-soul, but they do not stand alone. There are, generally, two widely different views concerning the immediate fate of man after death, and these, however sharply contrasted, are quite easily entertained by the same person. On the one hand, there is the idea of rest in the grave until the day of Resurrection and Judgment, on the other the departed soul is thought immediately to enter the

eternal world and the presence of God — or the place of punishment. I am well aware that these are different dogmas, but the fact that they are so easily interwoven, e.g. in religious poetry, and in the simple faith of the common man, must be due to the same psychological causes which make us build up our conception of the dead person both from the memory of his living shape — the image-soul — and from the associations connected with his presence in the grave. In a similar manner imagination wavers between the notion of the dead being in their graves and that of their being in heaven. And thus the two ideas may stand quite peaceably together, e.g. in the same poem. Longfellow begins his beautiful hymn, Blessed are the dead, in the following manner (that this poem is a translation from the German, does not of course affect the argument):

> O, how blest are ye whose toils are ended!
> Who, through death, have unto God ascended!
> Ye have arisen
> From the cares which keep us still in prison.

Any reader will understand this to mean that the souls of the dead are in Paradise, and this interpretation seems corroborated by the following verse, where the blessed state of the dead is opposed to the toils and troubles, the sorrows and misgivings of those still living on earth. But then the poem goes on:

> Ye, meanwhile, are in your chambers sleeping,
> Quiet, and set free from all our weeping. . . .

The chambers where the dead are sleeping must be their graves. Nevertheless, immediately after these words we read that:

> No cross, nor trial
> Hinders your enjoyment with denial.

This cannot very well refer to the sojourn in the grave, as the following verse shows still more clearly:

> Christ has wiped away your tears for ever;
> You have that for which we still endeavour.
> To you are chanted
> Songs which yet no mortal ear have haunted.

And the end of the hymn too, shows that the blessed life of the liberated soul is the real theme:

> Ah! who would not, then, depart with gladness,
> To inherit heaven for earthly sadness?
> Who here would languish
> Longer in bewailing and in anguish?
>
> Come, O Christ, and loose the chains that bind us!
> Lead us forth, and cast this world behind us!
> With thee, the Anointed,
> Finds the *soul* its joy and rest appointed.

I am not venturing to criticize Longfellow, nor any other poet. I am only underlining the fact that there is a real discrepancy within the general view of these things — and nowhere are current religious conceptions, the living faith, better to be traced than in religious poetry, which, in fact, to a great extent also helps to shape the common creed.

The Hymnary of the Church of Scotland contains a hymn which will take us a little further (No. 312):

> Days and moments quickly flying
> Blend the living with the dead:
> Soon will you and I be lying
> Each within our narrow bed!
>
> Soon our souls to God who gave them
> Will have spead their narrow flight. . . .

The self is in the grave, but the soul is in heaven. Consequently there is a difference between the soul and the ego. This may appear as a hair-splitting interpretation, and I am certainly not suggesting that the author shared the view expressed in the Iliad, yet, on the other hand, the last verse runs:

> Soon before the Judge all glorious
> We with all the dead shall stand:
> Saviour, over death victorious,
> Place us then at Thy right hand.

This evidently refers to the day of Last Judgment, when the dead arise from their graves.

Not to multiply instances, I will only refer to some lines written by J. Taylor:[4]

> And take *me* when I die
> And go unto my dust; my *soul*
> Above the sky
> With saints enrol,
> That in Thy arms, for ever, *I*
> May lie.

The conceptual difficulties here met with are significant. They are not only due to the fact that we cannot conceive of anything absolutely immaterial — this is the reason why we always conceive of the dead as possessing the same outer contour, so to speak, as when living, and this in its turn causes our associations to go to the body in the grave; the difficulty also lies in this: where does the border-line run between soul and body? The obvious answer to the question of immortality might seem to be that what lives on after death, if anything at all, is the soul in the sense of the personality. However, this is not so simple as it appears. Historically it is not, as we have seen, the first answer to the question, and logically — or psychologically — we are immediately confronted by the more complex question whether man's personality, or his real self, or however we choose to express it, is totally distinct from his body. And if this question is answered in the negative — that is, if we assume the personality to be subject to modifications resulting from changes of the body, if we consider it to be in some way affected by the state of the body, and still more, if we make the supposition that the personality is tied up with the body as an expression of the corporeal state, then it becomes necessary to distinguish, somehow or other, between the soul that lives on after death and the soul that constitutes the self of a living human being, provided, of course, that we still believe in immortality. The difficulty is to find a means for the continued existence of the individual personality.

On the other hand, exactly the same difficulty arises when, as is often the case, the immortality of the human soul is thought to be

[4] Quoted from Francis T. Palgrave, The Treasury of Sacred Song, Oxford 1906, p. 127.

due to its being of a divine nature. As the divine must be regarded as being everywhere of one and the same quality, immortality cannot affect that which separates the individuals, only that which unites them. The divine and immortal element is therefore the same in all souls, the common and unifying element in them all, and hence there is no longer any place for individual immortality — if the ultimate consequences of the given suppositions are drawn.

When, in older Greek belief, a distinction was made between man's real self and the surviving soul, this was evidently due to the fact that personality, no less than such qualities as we too call physical, was conceived of as a function of the body. Essentially, it may be added, it makes of course no difference, whether, e.g., the intellect is located in the brain, or in the midriff, or even in the stomach; in as far as intellect and personality are identified, personality is of a physical nature. The necessary inference — that the personal self, as dependent upon the body, cannot survive after death — is also drawn in Homer, where the whole of personal life is regarded as resting upon a physical basis. Thus reality is the material world; and to this personality belongs. Contrasting the Homeric and the Platonic views, we may say — making allowance for the exaggeration implied — that the Homeric world is a world of bodies, and the Platonic world a world of immaterial souls. In both cases the ego and the reality coincide — an immaterial ego is combined with a conception of true reality as being immaterial, and, on the other hand, if personality is identified with some part of the body, reality is thought of as in essence material. This, of course, is due to the psychological necessity of regarding self as the nearest reality — if self is immaterially conceived, a depreciation not only of the outer world but also of the body will be a necessary consequence.

Beyond the fact that in a belief such as the Homeric personal immortality is not conceivable, some other implications are worthy of notice. Man has nothing divine in him. There is an insurmountable barrier between gods and men, and man is a cipher in comparison with the gods. The distance between them cannot be covered. In fact, we may call this a religion of distance, this idea being its central point. There is further no room for punishment after death, since there is nothing left to be punished, for the per-

sonal continuity is broken in death — the *psyche* being only an image and not the real self, even if a shadow and a name be left in Hades. If justice is to be dispensed, it must be done here on earth. Divine retribution does not extend over the limits of earthly life.

In the Aias of Sophocles, Odysseus says, "For I see that we are but phantoms, all we who live, or fleeting shadows" (l. 125). Pindar has the same thing still more strongly expressed: "Man is but a dream of a shadow" (P. VIII.95). The view of human life as a dream or a breath, a vapor and a shadow, is also met with in many passages of the Old Testament. The two religions where the distance between God and man is most clearly and most consistently worked out, are in fact the older Greek and the Israelitic, and in both cases life after death is a phantom-existence, in Hades or Sheol. "Man is like to vanity; his days are as a shadow that passeth away," says the Psalmist (Ps. 144:4), and the Christian hymn transcribes the same thought:

> As a shadow life is fleeting;
> As a vapour, so it flies [5]

The old Latin pestilential hymn, generally ascribed to Thymus (16th cent.), Aufer immensam, Deus, aufer iram, describes the condition of man in most expressive terms:

> Quid sumus quam faex putris, umbra, pulvis,
> Glebaque terrae?

In our hymns also another Old Testamental expression is often used, namely that man is a stranger and a pilgrim. In the Old Testament such expressions merely serve to give a vivid picture of man's nothingness — "For we are strangers before thee, and sojourners, as were all our fathers: our days on the earth are as a shadow, and there is none abiding" (I. Chron. 29:15). The hymns, however, use them in a quite different sense, presumably influenced by certain passages in the New Testament (e.g. Hebrews 11:13 sq., I. Peter 2:11). Man is a pilgrim and a stranger on earth, because his real home is elsewhere.

[5] Hymnary of the Church of Scotland, 312:6.

I'm a pilgrim, and I'm a stranger,
I can tarry, I can tarry but a night.[6]

Or:

Far from my heavenly home,
Far from my Father's breast,
Fainting I cry, 'Blest Spirit, come,
And speed me to my rest' . . .
God of my life, be near;
On thee my hopes I cast;
Oh guide me through the desert here,
And bring me home at last.[7]

The dark picture of the life on earth, and of the state of man, has as its background his true home in heaven, from where the soul once came to this earth; the heaven,

Whence we came, and wither, wending,
Soon we must through darkness go, —
To inherit bliss unending
Or eternity of woe.[8]

When this idea — which, by the way, in its Christian form is of course not always coupled with that of preexistence — makes its appearance in European literature for the first time, it is in a form that makes the break between old and new almost palpably obvious. This is in a fragment from Pindar where it is said that while the bodies of all men are subject to over-mastering death, an image of life remains alive, for it alone comes from the gods (fr. 131). But it is also said here that this image of life sleeps while the limbs are active; yet to those who sleep it reveals the future in dreams. The old conception of the image-soul still exists, but it is just on the point of changing into that of a divine substance in man, which at the same time is his personality. Here Pindar is preparing the way for Socrates and Plato.

In Pindar, as in many Christian hymns, there is a certain conflict between two opposite concepts. The soul belongs to another

[6] Hymnal of the Augustana-Synod, 338.
[7] The Oxford Hymn Book, 200 (H. F. Lyte).
[8] Hymnary of the Church of Scotland, 312:4.

world, but the very reality of earthly existence implies its separation from its true home. The soul is both connected with the divine and separated from it; the antinomy may be expressed by the terms distance and proximity. Pindar says that gods and men derive their breath from one mother, but he goes on to state that "measureless difference of power divides us, for the one is a thing of nought" (N. VI.1 sq.). We ought to know "of what estate we are" (P. III.60). So there is a distance between man and god in spite of the divine element in the immortal human soul.

It is a strange coincidence in the history of religion that the two ideas of distance and proximity which denote the two poles of religious life, received so to speak their permanent expression in the Greek language. Homer and tragedy on the one hand, Platonism on the other, are exact and everlasting manifestations each of its own side of this double experience. In Greece, these ideas are the characteristics of different epochs, we could perhaps say of different religions, yet always with the addition that, while the concept of distance or remoteness may occur fairly pure, its antithesis, the idea of proximity or vicinity, or even identity, is seldom, if at all, expressed without a feeling of tension between the two members of the antinomy.

If I am right, the main dividing-line in Greek religion goes right through the personality of Socrates. In him the new ideas which, with Orphism and kindred movements, poured in over late-archaic Greece, attained to an original and profoundly personal synthesis, in which the speculative and philosophic elements were radically pushed aside in favor of a purely religious solution. Nathan Söderblom rightly concluded that to Socrates the chief point of view was a religious one, and that his religion was a religion of faith.[9] Socrates builds his life entirely upon a confidence in the divine power whose voice he hears in his heart. The simplest, but also the deepest expression of this reliance are his words at the close of the Apology that no evil will ever befall a good man, neither in life nor in death, and that his cause is not neglected by the gods (Ap. 41 C-D). There is only one point to add to Söderblom's interpretation, though an important one. For his own part, Socrates distin-

[9] The Living God, Oxford 1933, p. 236.

guished between the perishable body and the soul that is the personality, and which, for this very reason, lives on after death. In the ethical claim, in the moral life, he met the divinity. The passage quoted above from the Phaedo contains only what can be read in and between the lines of the Apology. Socrates cannot himself have believed in one of the two alternatives proposed by him, in that of death as a dreamless sleep. But he regarded even the possibility of complete annihilation as a fortunate thing. So little did he care for a reward.[10]

If we wish to distinguish between the Socratic and the Platonic, as I believe we can and even ought to do, the difference consists, from a certain point of view, in the way in which the balance between distance and nearness is established. Socrates, and perhaps the early Plato, holds the antinomy together through the demand for justice and personal responsibility. To Plato, the idea of vicinity gains more and more in importance; hence with him a dialectic development takes place, leading on, through contempt of the world and an increasingly negative view of the material nature, to the idea that only part of the soul, the innermost part which is pure reason, is immortal (Timaeus 69 C sq.). This points the way to the later Platonism, to Plotinus, and to the Stoa. And here, from a starting-point directly opposed to that of Homer, the same result is arrived at, namely, the evanescence of personality. The divine element in man is something beyond his will and thought, beyond his emotions and actions. At least in the consistent doctrine, the spark of the flaming world-soul which according to the Stoics constitutes the human soul is merged after death in the universal flame, is lost in it without a name and an individuality.

One of the motives most active in favor of the belief in a life hereafter is no doubt the demand for justice and retribution. Both in Greece and in the Old Testament we see what problems the religion of distance carried with it for the belief in divine justice. In both places the concept of hereditary guilt was resorted to. Only divine retribution unto the third and fourth generation could seem to save the faith in a righteous universe. Again, if there is a

[10] Eranos XLIV (=Eranos Rudbergianus), 1946, p. 105 sq.

belief in real immortality, that is in the survival of personality, the demand for justice is provided for in a completely different way. There is no longer any need to balance the account in this life, whether in that of the sinner himself or in that of his descendants. But the belief in immortality not only gives the moral problem a more acceptable solution; the moral claim is presented with far greater severity. For the distance which, in spite of the divine descent of the soul, still exists between man and god, is now felt to be essentially qualitative — man is not only humble, he is also sinful, be it that the stress is laid on an original sin as the cause of his empirical existence, or merely on the qualities given him by nature and the actions consequent on these, or on both,

> An heir of guilt, a child of sin,
> An *exile* in a world like this.[11]

This is the religious point of view, and is here the most important.

The belief in immortality is sometimes regarded as a day-dream of mankind. This may be true in some instances, but by no means in all. The dream of immortality may even be a nightmare. The conception of immortality, carried to its logical conclusion, cannot, as we have seen, well avoid the question of preexistence: the soul, if divine, ought properly to be immortal not only in regard to the future, but also backwards in time. That which cannot die must be eternal. Hence the eternal soul has a preexistence. If this conception is combined with the conception that the fate of the soul after death depends on its earthly life, one easily, even if not necessarily, arrives at the belief in metempsychosis. But here we can see not only that the idea of distance becomes dominating under the pressure of this moral aspect, but also, which is a fact worthy of consideration, that transmigration, and existence itself, are regarded as punishments. The most consistent version of this doctrine, the Indian, is surely anything but a day-dream. Never before was the demand for justice thus carried on to its utmost limits, never did the majesty of justice appear in so terrifying an aspect, and nowhere else is it so evident that the belief in immortality alone is incapable of bridging the infinite distance between man and his God.

[11] H. F. Lyte, quoted from Palgrave, op. cit. p. 246.

In one of the Upanishads Artabhaga is interrogating Yajnavalkya about the lot of man after death. " 'Yajnavalkya,' said he, 'when the voice of a dead man goes into fire, his breath into wind, his eye into the sun, his mind into the moon, his hearing into the quarters of heaven, his body into the earth, his soul (*atman*) into space, the hairs of his head into plants, the hairs of his body into trees, and his blood and semen are placed in water, what then becomes of his person (*purusa*)?' — 'Artabhaga, my dear, take my hand. We two only will know of this. This is not for us two to speak of in public.' — The two went away and deliberated. What they said was *karma* (action). What they praised was *karma*. Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action." [12]

An action never dies. No deed is without effect. At every moment, man's life is controlled by his past actions; but at the moment of death, all his actions have not yet reached their effects, and thus in a new existence man has to bear the consequences of his previous life — he is regenerated into the shape he deserves. This is a moral causality which, so to speak, wholly belongs to the physical world. That which man takes with him, when he dies, are his deeds which follow him like shadows. But they are active in a new temporal existence.

The wise and gentle Buddha was aware that life is suffering. Everything is perishable, nothing lasts for more than a brief space, not even that which is noblest and best, and yet there is no end. The life I live is only one link in an uncounted series of existences, each equally ephemeral, equally vain, and equally transient. The dismal part of this prospect, and that which induced Buddha to look for a way of salvation, was that the ephemeral, unreliable, unsettled, and non-essential, was at the same time eternal, ineluctable, interminable; and thus salvation was to be sought in an escape from existence itself. Life had no fixed point, the only thing given being an endless chain of causality — of moral causes and effects — through existence after existence. Pessimism is often a form of idealism. Pessimism makes certain claims on life, and finds that its claims are not answered by human life. The characteristic of pessimism as opposed to resignation is that it

[12] Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad 3.2.13. Here and in the following I use the translation of R. E. Hume (The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Oxford 1921).

does not renounce these claims. But the most fathomless pessimism is the Indian, for it is directed not only against the troubles and adversities of life, but against life itself. Thus salvation is demanded not, as in many other religions, *for* life, but *from* life. By comparison, ordinary Western pessimism appears almost exuberantly cheerful.

As is well known, Buddha found salvation through the extinction of desire. Not the ascetic suppression of sensual power, but the ceasing of the very thirst for life, at last brings the endless migration to a halt. A statement ascribed to Buddha in later Buddhist tradition gives the whole atmosphere:

> Through worldly round of many births
> I ran my course unceasingly,
> Seeking the maker of the house:
> Painful is birth again and again.
> House-builder! I behold thee now,
> Again a house thou shalt not build;
> All thy rafters are broken now,
> The ridge-pole also is destroyed;
> My mind, its elements dissolved,
> The end of craving has attained.[13]

No better proof can be found of the strength of the demand for justice, than the fact that Buddha, who denied the existence of the soul, nevertheless did not drop the idea of transmigration. To him, the only reality consisted in the connection between actions and their consequences. Behind this series there is no unity, no universal soul, no soul within the complex called man. Yet man must be born again as a result of his past actions. In fact, if retribution is to have its way, there is no escape for anybody. And thus annihilation becomes the most hotly desired human object. If religion is an illusion, it must be admitted that it has not always made it easier to live; and if justice is no more than an idea, man has at any rate placed his aim high enough and brandished the whip mostly over his own back.

This moral claim, allowing of no reduction, may serve as another instance of that view concerning the state of man which we

[13] Dhammapada 153–154, quoted from E. J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha, London 1927, p. 75,

have denoted as the idea of distance. There is not the shadow of a thought about anything else than that man is infinitely far away from the divine world, and the only way there leads through a series of successive improvements of his moral status. But so long is the way, and so great the distance, that the possibility of complete annihilation became a gospel of salvation to a vast part of the Indian people.

Yet even in Buddhism the other idea is present. Notwithstanding the fact that Buddha denied the existence of the soul and although Nirvana should denote absolute extinction, there is a place also for the idea of nearness, of identity, of reconciliation with the divine. This is not only true of later Buddhism; it holds good of the original doctrine as well. Nirvana bears too great a resemblance to Brahman — the all-power, in which according to other forms of Indian belief the soul was to be merged — for us not to have the right to speak of real salvation, not only of extinction, in Buddhism too. And here lies the connection between Buddhism and the mysticism of the Upanishads.

If in Buddhism the idea of distance is so strongly emphasized that its contrast, proximity, can only be shown to be there by a closer examination, the case is quite the reverse in the Upanishads — as in mysticism generally. The central word is: that art thou (*tat tvam asi*). "That which is the finest essence — this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Atman. That art thou." [14] The human soul and the soul of the universe are one and the same. The true essence of man, his *atman*, is identical with *brahman*, with the unity of the cosmos. When the veil of the material world is drawn back and the soul sees its real unity with the infinite, then it is released from transmigration.

> He who has found and has awakened to the Soul
> That has entered this conglomerate abode,
> He is the maker of everything, for he is the
> creator of all;
> The world is his: indeed, he is the world itself.[15]

This is the idea of vicinity brought to its last consequence: vicinity raised to identity. Accordingly, the formula runs: you *are* it; not:

[14] Chandogya Upanishad 6.9.4.
[15] Brihad Aranayaka Upanishad 4.4.13.

you *become* it. Why then is a salvation, some form of conversion, necessary? In the Upanishads, the way of salvation is marked out by sacrifice, good conduct, asceticism, and contemplation. But no external expedients are wholly sufficient. They cannot carry the soul quite through to its goal. It is true that the Upanishads teach salvation through knowledge, yet this is a knowledge in which learning is of no use, and reason does not suffice:

> Not by reasoning is this thought to be attained.
> Proclaimed by another, indeed, it is for easy understanding.[16]

A teacher is required. But the teacher can do no more — and which teacher can? — than, at best, conduct the pupil to the border of personal experience. He can describe the experience, but not replace it:

> Not, when proclaimed by an inferior man, is He
> To be well understood, though being manifoldly considered.
> Unless declared by another, there is no going thither.[17]

Or, in another passage:

> This Soul (*Atman*) is not to be obtained by instruction,
> Nor by intellect, nor by much learning.
> He is to be obtained only by the one whom He chooses;
> To such a one that Soul reveals his own person.[18]

The saving insight is ultimately a gift of grace. The unity of man and God is brought home to us through contemplation, through a mystical experience; but like so many other mystics, the authors of the Upanishads have been made fully aware of the futility of human exertions. They relied on an experience, whose hold on their souls was the deeper because it came about as a revelation. Only thus it is possible to understand that the unity between God and man must be realized in order to bring about salvation; the insight consists in the very experience of unity. And in this experience the soul is felt to be raised above normal life, above death and extinction, above *karma* and *samsara*. This is,

[16] Katha Upanishad 2.9.
[17] Ib. 2.8.
[18] Ib. 2.23.

however, no individual immortality. Freed from the bonds of earthly life, the soul is also exempt from the fetters of individuality.

This does not of course fit logically. If the soul is identical with the divinity, then it is also saved and free. When what we should call a conversion, an experience involving a radical change, is nevertheless supposed to be necessary, this reveals that the root of the matter here is not the theoretical reasoning, but the encounter with the divine. This experience contained something altogether new, viz. union and identity, but on the other hand the soul to whom such an experience can occur must in itself be divine; it is, moreover, altogether divine, and does not become so when meeting the Absolute. Those who made the experience did not make it in such a shape that they could interpret the course of events as a transformation of their souls, but rather as a realization of something for ever existing. Yet the unity between man and God was not felt before the moment of illumination, and the experience was of such a revolutionary fullness that it had to be regarded as a necessary condition for attaining salvation.

> Now whoever departs from this world / i.e. the world of the Atman / without having recognized it as his own, to him it is of no service, because it is unknown, as the unrecited Vedas or any other undone deed do not help a man/.[19]

Yet here also there is a double experience. As opposed to the sense of unity there stands, no less strong, a feeling of human limitation, expressed in the notions of *karma* and *samsara*, of all that from which man asks to be delivered, the earthly bonds from which only the mystical experience can set him free. The distance is only too real — it accounts for the length and difficulty of the way of salvation.

The dialectic process runs in a circle, allowing the primitive distinction between a free-soul and the corporeal soul(s) to return in a refined although not in an unrecognizable form. The problem of immortality is, from one point of view, to find something that is everlasting. If this cannot be the varying functions of the body, nor that part of psychic life which is, in one way or another, con-

[19] Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad 1.4.15.

nected with the body, individual immortality is easily denied. To the later Plato, as we have seen, only that part of the soul was immortal which consists in pure reason. Schleiermacher, in his Reden, is likewise brought to a denial of the survival of the personality:

> Was aber die Unsterblichkeit betrifft, so kann ich nicht bergen, die Art, wie die meisten Menschen sie nehmen, und ihre Sehnsucht danach ist ganz irreligiös, dem Geist der Religion gerade zuwider, ihr Wunsch hat keinen andern Grund, als die Abneigung gegen das, was das Ziel der Religion ist. Erinnert Euch, wie in ihr alles darauf hinstrebt, dass die scharf abgeschnittenen Umrisse unsrer Persönlichkeit sich erweitern und sich allmählich verlieren sollen ins Unendliche, dass wir durch das Anschauen des Universums so viel als möglich eins werden sollen mit ihm; sie aber sträuben sich gegen das Unendliche, sie wollen nicht hinaus, sie wollen nichts sein als sie selbst und sind ängstlich besorgt um ihre Individualität. Erinnert Euch, wie es das höchste Ziel der Religion war, ein Universum jenseits und über der Menschheit zu entdecken, und ihre einzige Klage, dass es damit nicht recht gelingen will auf dieser Welt; jene aber wollen nicht einmal die einzige Gelegenheit ergreifen, die ihnen der Tod darbietet, um über die Menschheit hinaus zu kommen; sie sind bange, wie sie sie mitnehmen werden jenseits dieser Welt und streben höchstens nach weiteren Augen und besseren Gliedmassen.[20]

It may, in fact, be questioned, what we really consider as our self. We may be aware that we would not have been exactly the same in different conditions of life, after different outer and inner experiences. Yet we regard ourselves as some sort of unity remaining through change and development. That is the inner self, the basis of personality. The ego that is individual and original — do we in the end really wish to accept it? "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." Which ego is the true one?

From another point of view, we arrive at the same result. When the belief in immortality is founded on the idea of identity between God and man, the result must, as already remarked, in the last instance be a denial of the continued existence of the individual. Atman is thought to be identical with brahman, and therefore atman must be the same in all human beings: the inmost self

[20] Über die Religion, 1799, p. 131.

of one person cannot be distinguished from that of another, if both are identical with one and the same all-life. "It is strange that, though we all say our 'I am,' we nevertheless fancy ourselves to be so far, so essentially, separated from one another. Is it not the same spirit in all of us which from our thousand mouths says his 'I am,' thus proving himself and us true?" This was said, not by an Indian mystic, but by the Swedish poet Runeberg.[21] The same idea is, however, met with in the Upanishads — "He is your soul, which is in all things." [22] If the inmost self is divine, the consequences will follow of themselves. That which separates man from the divine must be his temporal and perishable qualities — but it is only those which can serve to distinguish one human being from another. The real self is something behind all those, the *Seelengrund*. The immortal soul is not that which lives in the world, participating in the vicissitudes of life. Here we are not far from Pindar: the immortal soul which sleeps when man is active, and is active when man sleeps:

> Striking down in sleep what is bodily,
> Sleepless he looks down upon the sleeping [senses].
> Having taken to himself light, there returns to his place
> The golden person, the one spirit.
> Guarding his low nest with the breath,
> The Immortal goes forth out of the nest.
> He goes where'er he pleases — the immortal,
> The golden person, the one spirit.[23]

Only when the body is dead and when all those parts of the soul which have something to do with the body have vanished, can the true immortal spirit live in freedom and purity. Runeberg pursued this doctrine of the "Seelengrund" so far that he considered the essence of man to be unaffected in all the vicissitudes of life by sins and crimes, by flaws and frailties. In the depth of his soul every man, whatever his life may have been, is unsullied and pure.[24] This view too has parallels in Indian mysticism:

[21] G. Tideström, Runeberg (Diss. Uppsala 1941) p. 395.
[22] Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad 3.4.1.
[23] Ib. 4.3.11.
[24] Tideström, op. cit. p. 370, 375.

There a father becomes not a father; a mother, not a mother; the worlds, not the worlds; the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas; a thief, not a thief [25] — In the space within the heart lies the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not become greater by good action nor inferior by bad action. He is the lord of all, the overlord of beings, the protector of beings. . . . That Soul (Atman) is not this, it is not that. It is unseizable, for it cannot be seized. It is undestructible, for it cannot be destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unbound. It does not tremble. It is not injured. Him / who knows this / these two do not overcome — neither the thought 'Hence I did wrong,' nor the thought 'Hence I did right.' Verily, he overcomes them both. What he has done and what he has not done do not affect him.[26]

In every religion a distinction is drawn between the divine and the human. The decisive point is where the line is supposed to run. But when the idea of immortality has once arisen, the distinction between divine and human necessarily breaks down, at least to a certain extent. The mixture of these different views, and the dialectic inherent in the thought of individual immortality, are ever active forces in the attempts of man to explain to himself his place in the universe. The term personal immortality will perhaps present the problem in its strictest form. The individual is so to speak man seen from without, as distinguished from other men; personality is his inmost self, the special contents of his ego. The shades in Hades are individual, but they have no real personality. Now it clearly is to this real self that man's expectations of immortality are fixed. Also from a moral point of view, personal immortality — and responsibility — are required; on the other hand, the divine element in man is easily supposed to be something different from the individual personality. A Stoic, whose religiosity was far stronger than his systematic capacity, may serve as the concluding instance of this. Seneca says, "We have all of us sinned; we not only do wrong, but we will continue to do so to the end of time; we are all evil and live among those who are evil; even if you have done no wrong, you may yet do it; what you disapprove of in others, you can find in your own heart." But he also calls the soul

[25] Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad 4.3.22.

[26] Ib. 4.4.22. Cp. here also Corp. Herm. XII 7 and Festugière's note on this passage [in: Corpus Hermeticum, ed. A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière (Collection Budé) I p. 194 sq.] I am indebted to Professor M. P. Nilsson for this reference.

a part of the divine spirit, immersed in the human body, a divinity visiting man. Summing up the two points of view he once says that a *sacer spiritus*, a holy spirit inside us sees and judges our actions. "God is near you, he is with you, within you." [27]

Distance and nearness, the personal and the superpersonal are here contending against each other with the elemental power born of experience, and the clearest proof that the belief in immortality, if anything but a theoretical hypothesis, rests upon an experience of divine proximity, is seen in the fact that the Stoics were able to solve the problem we have here everywhere encountered — the combination of the ideas of human insufficience and of human highness — only through making a radical distinction between two categories of beings: the wise and the foolish, the ones as absolutely perfect as the others are absolutely imperfect. The fool may become wise, but in the consistent doctrine, this is brought about through a sudden and abrupt change. The Stoics had to suffer much ignominy for a doctrine which was supposed to imply that a man could go to bed of an evening ugly and poor, sick and miserable, foolish and faulty, to awake in the morning handsome and rich, hale and hearty, wise and perfect. Yet this quaint proposition is to be taken seriously. Like others, the Stoics had experienced salvation as a gift of grace. In the union with the divine they had found freedom, perfection, and bliss. They had learned that freedom was gained in obedience to the divine necessity:

> Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
> Whither ordainèd is by your decree.
> I'll follow, doubting not, or if with will
> Recreant I falter, I shall follow still.

Epictet, when quoting these lines by Cleanthes, couples them with a passage from the Crito, "Well, Crito, if this be the gods' will, so be it," and one from the Apology, "Anytus and Meletus have power to put me to death, but not to harm me." [28] The belief in immortality is a form of trust. It rests on experience, not on syllogisms.

The two experiences — the distance and the nearness — reflect the eternal disharmony of man and his unceasing attempts to over-

[27] De Clementia I 6.3; De Ira III 26.4; Epist. 66.12, 31.11, 41.1 sq.
[28] Enchiridion ch. 53, transl. by P. E. Matheson, Oxford 1916.

come the deep cleft in his soul. Where the belief in immortality is the outcome of a religious craving, it has its roots in discontent with the earthly existence. What is sought for is salvation, whether this is conceived in the form of that dreamless sleep which surpasses all the glory of the great Persian king, or in the extinction of individuality in an unlimited space, or in the union with a personal deity. Our hymns have words to express both the peaceful sleep in the grave and the eternal bliss.

Halftone Plate

A *TABELLA DEFIXIONIS* IN THE MUSEUM OF THE UNIVERSITY OF READING, ENGLAND [1]

J. M. R. CORMACK

University of Reading, England

The leaden tablet, on which this *defixio* is written, was presented to the University of Reading by Dr. W. H. Buckler, F.B.A., who bought it in Constantinople from an antique-dealer, who gave Claudiopolis in Bithynia (the modern Bulu) as its provenance. The number of *defixiones* from Asia Minor is comparatively small (K. Preisendanz in his 'Die griechischen und lateinischen Zaubertafeln,' Archiv f. Papyrusforschung, ix, 1930, 119–154, mentions thirteen from Caria, two from Phrygia, and one from Pontus), and, if this tablet really comes from Claudiopolis, it is the first, so far as I know, to be reported from this region.

It measures 0.35 m. in width, and 0.15 m. in height, being broken vertically (presumably where it was folded) [2] into four parts which join, and is complete, except for a small piece from the bottom of the left-hand corner and another from the top where the first and second fragments join. (See Halftone Plate). The surface is heavily corroded, especially along the vertical line where the first and second fragments join. It is difficult to assign a precise date to the *defixio*, but I should judge it, from a comparison with similar documents, to belong to the third or fourth century A.D.

[1] In writing the commentary I have been indebted for helpful suggestions to Professor Campbell Bonner, Dr. W. H. Buckler, Professor A. D. Nock, Mr. M. N. Tod, Dr. S. Weinstock, and Professor H. C. Youtie.

[2] See A. Audollent, 'Quelques aspects extérieurs des *Tabellae Defixionum*' in Mélanges offerts à M. N. Iorga, Paris, 1933, 31–9.

I

Γράνιλλα
Καπίτων
Γράνιλλα
Ῥ[ο]ῦφος
Φιλωνῖνος
Στατιλιανὸς
Ἀγαθήμερος
Εὐτύχης
Μερκούριος
Εὔνους
Βάσσος
Πρῖμος
Θάλαμος
Ἕλενος
Καπιτωλῖνος
Δημητρᾶς
Ἀπολλ[ι]νάρις
Δ[ημ]ητρᾶς

II

Δημ[ητρᾶς(?)]
Παρθ – –
Ἵλαρος
Αὐξίοχος
Ἀριαράθης
Κάστωρ
Ἑρμῆς
Εὐτύχης
Φιλωνῖν[ο]ς
Βάσσος
Εὔαγρος
Πήγασο[ς]
Νίγελλο[ς]
Οὐαλερία
Μᾶ
Λαμύρα
Πλόκιο[ν]
Λουκία
Δημητρᾶς

III

[Ἀ]θηναῖς
[Ἀν]τωνία
[Ἀθ]ηναῖς
[Ἵλ]αρος
Ὑάκινθος
πάντες οὗτοι
ἔ[στ]ωσαν κατα-
[δε]δεμένοι,
μὴ ἀντιλέγον-
τες, [μ]ὴ λαλοῦν-
τες, μὴ ἐνβλέ-
ποντες, ἀλλὰ
ἄναυδοι,
κωφοὶ ἔστω-
σαν, μηδὲν κατ' αὐ-
[τοῦ] λέγοντες
Καπετωλίνου,
ὃν ἔτεκε Δανάη,
ἡ καὶ Καλή,
διὰ τὴν τῶν
ὀνομάτων
δύναμιν.

IV

κύριοι θεοί, καταδήσατε
πάντας τοὺς ἐνγεγραμ-
μένους, Ὑεσεμμιγάδων
Ὀρθὼ Βαυβὼ νοηρ
οδηρε σοιρε σαν
κανθαρα Ἐρεσχιγὰλ
σανκιστη δωδεκακιστη
ἀκρουροβόρε κοδηρε
ιω ιω ιω αρβεθε
ιω απερβεθε ιω
αρβαθ Ἰαω
ιω ιω αρβεθε
ιω απερβεθε ιω αβραθ
Ἰαω ιω αβραθ Ἰαω
ιω Ἀβρασάξ, κύριοι θεοὶ
ἄνγελοι, καταδήσατε
πάντας τοὺς ἐνγεγραμ-
μένους πάντα ἐπ' αὐ-
τῶν ἰσχὺν κατέναντι

V

Καπετωλίνου,
ὃν ἔτεκε Δανάη,
ἡ καὶ Καλή.

Translation

Granilla, Capito, Granilla, Rufus, Philoninus, Statilianus, Agathemerus, Eutyches, Mercurius, Eunous, Bassus, Primus, Thalamus, Helenus, Capitolinus, Demetras, Apollinaris, Demetras, Dem[etras(?)], Parth--, Hilarus, Auxiochus, Ariarathes, Castor, Hermes, Eutyches, Philoninus, Bassus, Evagrus, Pegasus, Nigellus, Valeria, Ma, Lamyra, Plocion, Lucia, Demetras, [A]thenais, [An]tonia, [Ath]enais, [Hil]arus, Hyacinthus.

Let all these be spellbound; let them not speak against, let them not utter a word, let them not spy on Capetolinus, but let them be speechless, dumb, saying nothing against Capetolinus, son of Danaë, also called Lovely; through the power of the names.

Sovereign gods, bind with your spells all those herein written: Hyesemmigadon, Ortho, Baubo, noer, odere, soire, san, kanthara, Ereschigal, sankiste, dodekakiste, akrourobore, kodere, io, io, io, arbethe, io, aperbethe, io, arbath Iao, io, io, arbethe, io, aperbethe, io, abrath Iao, io, abrath Iao, io, Abrasax, sovereign gods and angels, bind with your spell all those herein written, in respect of all the power they possess, before the face of Capetolinus, son of Danaë, also called Lovely.

Commentary

Of the forty-two proper names in columns I, II and III about three-quarters are of men and the remainder of women, about three-quarters Greek and one-quarter Latin. There are several cases where the same name appears more than once: Γράνιλλα (I, ll. 1, 3); Εὐτύχης (I, l. 8, II, l. 8); Δημητρᾶς (I, ll. 16, 18, II, l. 1, if the proposed restoration is accepted, and II, l. 19); Ἴλαρος (II, l. 3, and perhaps III, l. 4); Βάσσος (I, l. 11, II, l. 10); Ἀθηναῖς, if the restorations in III, ll. 1 and 3 are accepted.

Examples occur in our text of many of the classes to which M. Lambertz assigned slave-names in his study, 'Die griechischen Sklavennamen' in Jahresbericht über das k. k. Staatsgymnasium im VIII. Bezirke Wiens, lvii, 1907, I Teil, 3–49, and lviii, 1908, II Teil, 3–42.

Under his heading 'II. Der Sklave ist nach seiner Heimat benannt' we may quote Βάσσος (I, l. 11, II, l. 10); cf. Mary L.

Gordon, 'The Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire,' JRS, xiv, 1924, 96–7, 'Bassus as a slave-name may sometimes be an ethnicon,' and p. 97, footnote 1, 'The Bassi were a tribe in Belgium'; Πάρθ[ος], too, if we thus restore II, l. 2, comes under this head.

Under 'IV. Namen nach historischen Persönlichkeiten' we may instance Ἀριαράθης (II, l. 5); under 'V. Der Sklave führt den Namen eines Heros,' Ἕλενος (I, l. 14), Κάστωρ (II, l. 6), quoted as the name of a δοῦλος, Lambertz, op. cit., lvii, 25; as an extension of this category we may cite mythological names like Τάκινθος (III, l. 5), Πήγασο[ς] (II, l. 12), and Παρθ[ενόπη], if we thus restore II, l. 2. To Lambertz's category 'VI. Götternamen als Sklavennamen' belong Μερκούριος (I, l. 9) and Ἑρμῆς (II, l. 7), quoted as the name of a δοῦλος op. cit., lvii, 28, Μᾶ (II, l. 15); cf. M. L. Gordon, op. cit., 97: 'Occasionally slaves bear the names of foreign deities, such as Ma, the Phrygian goddess (C.I.L. vi, 4244).' As examples of Lambertz's class 'VIII. Vollnamen, welche als ersten Bestandteil den Namen eines Gottes haben, als Sklavennamen', we may mention Δημητρᾶς (I, ll. 16, 18, II, l. 19), Καπιτωλῖνος (I, l. 15), Ἀπολλ[ι]νάρις (I, l. 17), Ἀθηναῖς (III, ll. 1 and 3, if we accept the restorations proposed); for Ἀθηναῖς as a slave-name cf., with Lambertz, op. cit., lvii, 36–7, BGU, III, 887, 31–2: δούλης Σαμ|βατίδος μετονομασθείσης Ἀθηναίδ[ος]; if we read Παρθ[ένιος] in II, l. 2, this would come under the heading of servile names which seem to have originated from the epithets of gods; cf. M. L. Gordon, op. cit., 97. Under 'X. Adjektiva als Sklavennamen; A. Durch den Namen werden gute Eigenschaften des Geistes und Charakters rühmend hervorgehoben' come Εὔνους (I, l. 10), Lambertz, op. cit., lviii, 4 and Ἴλαρος (II, l. 3, and III, l. 4, if we accept the restoration there), ibid. 5; under 'XIII. Wunschnamen als Sklavennamen', Εὐτύχης (I, l. 8, II, l. 8), ibid., 21, and Ἀγαθήμερος (I, l. 7), ibid., 20; cf. for Ἀγαθήμερος as a slave-name P. Mich., IV, 360.71, and for Εὐτύχης ibid., VI, 380.9. For Καπίτων (I, l. 2) and Ῥ[ο]ῦφος (I, l. 4) cf. M. L. Gordon, op. cit., 96: 'Servile names do not often take the form of nicknames derived from physical peculiarities. . . . The chief exception is Rufus or more often Rufio,' and Tenney Frank, 'Race Mixture in the Roman Empire,' Ameri-

can Hist. Rev., xxi, 1916, 107: 'Some slave names . . . were given as nicknames, such as Rufio or Capito, which are also found among the earliest personal cognomina of free men.'

A similar list of names occurs in Raccolta Lumbroso, Milan, 1925, in C. C. Edgar's 'Records of a village club,' where Edgar comments (pp. 369–70): 'Such names . . . which are fanciful names of the sort that people bestowed on their slaves, are significant as to the social status of the club. It is true that any one of them, taken separately, would not necessarily stamp a man. . . . But when we find a whole group of men with such names, the chances are that they belonged to the menial class.' The names in our *defixio* are clearly those of people belonging to this menial class, but, whether they are slaves or freedmen or even free men is not clear; on the whole, I should be inclined to put them in the servile class.

Column III

Ll. 6–19: In addition to the many contemporary parallels to this *defixio*, which probably belongs to the class described by A. Audollent, Defixionum Tabellae, Paris, 1904, 471–2, as *Iudiciariae et in inimicos conscriptae*, there is a remarkable echo in the Greek MS, written at the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, edited by A. Delatte, Anecdota Atheniensia, Bibliothèque de la faculté de phil. et lettres de l'université de Liège, xxxvi, 1927, 97, ll. 3–9:

δήνω τους, γλωσσοδήνω τους, καταστρώνω
τους, σελλώνω, χαλινώνω τους, μουτταρώνω τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς τους,
τὴν γλῶσσάν τους, τὴν φωνήν τους, τοὺς καταλαλοῦντας μὲ τὸν
λόγον τους, νὰ μὴ δύνουνται νὰ ποιήσουν κακὸν διὰ ἐμένα,
διὰ λόγου μου ἢ κρυφίως ἢ φανερά· νὰ ἦναι ὡς ξύλα ἄλαλα, ὥσ-
περ οἱ λίθοι νὰ μὴν ἔχουσι γλῶσσαν ἢ λόγον ἢ ὁμιλίαν διὰ
ἐμένα τὸν Χριστόδουλον κτλ.

Ll. 11–12: *ἐνβλέποντες*, a reference to the evil eye, perhaps.

Ll. 13–14: Cf. *ἄφωνοι* in R. Wünsch, 'Neue Fluchtafeln' in Rhein. Mus., NF., lv, 1900, 72, no. 4, l. 3. Cf. also Audollent, op. cit., no. 25, ll. 16–18:

ἀλλὰ ὡς [ὑμις (*sic*) ἄταφοι κὲ ἄφω-]
νοι κὲ ἄλαλοι κὲ ἄγλωσσοι ο[ὗ]τω. . . .
.κὲ ἀντίδικοι ἦτωσαν ἄλαλοι ἄφ[ωνοι ἄγλωσσοι].

There is room for letters before ἄναυδοι and κωφοί, but the surface of the tablet is too defaced to detect any.

Ll. 17–19: Καπετωλῖνος (contrast the spelling with Καπιτωλῖνος in col. I, l. 15) is the author of the *defixio*; the same formula recurs in col. V, ll. 1–3. Cf. S. Eitrem, Papyri Osloenses, fasc. 1, 1925, 44: 'In magic, as is well known, the persons concerned are identified as sons of their mothers, not of their fathers.'

Ll. 20–22: This refers to the potency of the *voces magicae* and βάρβαρα γράμματα in col. IV.

Writing of the components of this magic A. D. Nock, JEA, XV, 1929, 228–9, says: 'We see in it a blend of Greek magic of the Hecate type with Egyptian and Jewish elements. Egypt's contribution was important. Magic was not here as in Greece under a cloud; the gods were credited with its invention and with the use of spells. . . . Again, Egypt had a magical literature committed to writing, in which occurs the device (common in our papyri) of the magician pretending to be a deity, the threats to deities which we know so well, the ascription of supernatural nature to the material employed, and the use of incomprehensible formulas: and in Egypt the tradition had an antiquity which moved deeply the imagination of immigrant Greeks. For the spells, Egypt gave the kernel of the λόγος. Judaism could offer its belief in the tremendous power and sanctity of the Name of God, its exorcisms, its angelology, its amulets and frontlets, and its impressive consciousness of close and personal relation with God "the living one," keenly interested at all times in the individual and prepared to interfere cataclysmically with the course of events. . . . Graeco-Egyptian magic draws on all these sources of religious energy, and on such other Greek and Oriental material as it can control. The blending which has taken place appears clearly in the *uoces magicae* or non-Greek names of gods. They include meaningless combinations of letters, combinations with numerical value and significance, vowel combinations, genuine Egyptian divine names, Coptic divine or daemonic names or off-

shoots thereof, old Greek Ἐφέσια γράμματα, at least one Babylonian divine name, Ereschigal, one possibly Assyrian name, Eulamo, Jewish sacred names, possibly Iranian and Mandaean names, and Greek names in correct or broken-down forms.'

Column IV

L. 1: *κύριοι θεοί*. Cf. ll. 15–16, where this expression is coupled with *ἄνγελοι*. For *κύριοι ἄνγελοι* cf. P. Princeton, III, 159, 9, S. Eitrem, Pap. Oslo. I, 44, Youtie and Bonner, TAPhA lxviii, 1937, 54(2), 55(20), 58, and D. M. Robinson, 'A Magical Text from Beroea in Macedonia' in Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of E. K. Rand, N. Y., 1938, 245–53, where the expression occurs on p. 246, l. 8, with Robinson's note on p. 251. Cf. also, among others, Augustine, De civ. Dei, ix, 19: 'ab aliis angelos dici, quos ipsi daemones nuncupant'; R. Wünsch, 'Deisidaimoniaka' in Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft, xii, 1909, 38, where *κύριοι ἄνγελοι* occurs in ll. 5–6 of text A, and *κύριοι θεοὶ* in l. 3 of text B, with the notes on p. 39; H. Leclercq in Cabrol, Dict. d'arch. chrét., I, 2080–2161 s.v. 'anges'; Drexler in Roscher, Lexikon, II, 1, 1755–69 s.v. 'Kyria and Kyrios.'

Ll. 3–8: Cf. Audollent, op. cit., no. 295, ll. 1–4:

Υεσσε[μ]ι γαδ[ων] ι α[ω] αω βαυβω
εηαηιε . . . σοπεσαν[3] καν-
θαρα ερησχιγαλ σανκιστη δωδε-
[κ?]ακητη[4] ἀκρουροβορε κοδηρε,

and id., ibid., p. 513, no. 123 for parallels from the papyri.

The magical papyri afford close parallels to the formula of our *defixio*; see especially K. Preisendanz, PGM, II, 32–4 (from Berlin P. 5026):

νεσσεμμιγα|δων ορθω · Βαυβώ · νοηρε · σοιρε · σοιρη σανκανθαρα · Ἐρεσχιγάλ· σανκιστη· δωδεκα|κιστη· ἀκρουροβόρε· κοδηρε,

and PGM, V, 424–6 (from the B. M. Pap. gr. XLVI):

Ὑεσεννιγαδων Ὀρθὼ Βαυ||βὼ νοη⟨ρε κ⟩οδηρε σοιρε σοιρε σαν|κανθαρα
Ἐρεσχιγὰλ σανκιστη | δωδεκακιστη ἀκρουροβορε κοδηρε

[3] May this be a mistake for *σοιρε σανκαν|θαρα*?
[4] Probably this should be corrected to *δωδε|[κ]ακιστη*.

and PGM, XIII, 923–5 (from P. Buch, Mus. van Oudh. Leiden, J. 395, alt Anast. 76):

Ὑσεμμιγα⟨δ⟩ων | Ὀρθώ, Βαυβώ, νοηραδηρ σοιρε σοιρε σανκαν | θαρα Ἐρεσχιγάλ.

Cf. also the glosses in The Demotic Magical Papyrus of London and Leiden, ed. F. Ll. Griffith and H. Thompson, London, 1905, VII, ll. 25–6:

25 καθαρα σαν συρε συρε νοηρε ορθω βαυβω υσενμιγαδων
κοδηρε ακρουροβορε δοδε κακιστη σαγγιστη ερεσχιγαλ.

Ll. 4–7: For a variant of this formula cf. J. A. Montgomery, Aramaic Incantation Texts, Philadelphia, 1913, 61:

ορθω βαυβω νοηρε κοδηρε
δυσηρε συρε συροε πανκιστη δωδεκακιστη.

L. 3: Ὑεσεμμιγάδων. Cf. Drexler in Roscher, Lexikon, I, 2, 2771 s.v. 'Hyesemmigadon.' The late Dr. Eisler suggested to me that this combination represents the Hebrew hu'a, the third personal pronoun, commonly used in glosses, '*id est*,' with šemō 'his name' and a corruption of gadol 'great', meaning 'i.e. his name is great.'

L. 4: Ὀρθὼ may be an alternative form of Ὀρθία (i.e. Artemis). Βαυβώ. Cf. M. P. Nilsson, 'Die Religion in den griechischen Zauberpapyri', Bull. de la société royale des lettres de Lund, 1947–8, II, 76: 'Die obszöne Baubo ist recht beliebt Epitheton der Hekate.' See also Schultz in Roscher, Lexikon, I, 1, 752–3 s.v. Cf. Hesychius s.v. Βαυβώ· τιθήνη Δήμητρος; C. A. Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Königsberg, 1829, II, 818–27: 'De Baubo et Cerere'; T. Hopfner, Griechisch-Ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber, Leipzig, 1921, I, p. 51, sect. 215: 'Weniger bekannt scheint dagegen ein weiblicher Daemon Βαβώ oder Βαυβώ gewesen zu sein, der unserem 'Wauwau' entspricht und mit der aus der Demetersage bekannten Figur Baubo zusammengeworfen wurde.' Cf. also W. K. C. Guthrie in OCD s.v.

Ll. 4–5: νοηρ οδηρε. These words appear in some texts as νοηρε κοδηρε but in our tablet there is a *vacat* at the end of l. 4 and at the beginning of l. 5.

Ll. 5–6: σαν κανθαρα. Editors can give no satisfactory explanation of these words, nor indeed decide whether they should be written as one or two words. The phrase in K. Preisendanz, PGM, XII, 184–5; σανκ]ανθαρα, ὁ τῆς φύσε||ως ἡγεμών, would suggest that this is the name of a divinity, but to what language the word belongs is not clear.

L. 6: Ἐρεσχιγάλ. M. P. Nilsson, op. cit. 62, knows of twelve examples of this goddess in magical papyri. H. Zimmern u. H. Winckler, Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, Berlin, 1902, II, 583, n. 2: 'die Bedeutung des sumerischen Namens *Ereškigal* ist "Herrin der Unterwelt." ' Cf. F. Legge, Proc. of the Soc. of Bibl. Arch., xxiii, 1901, 47, footnote.

L. 7: δωδεκακίστη, probably by the analogy of δωδέκατος, from δωδεκάκις. Cf. BSA xxvii, 75, no. 18.

L. 8: ἀκρουροβόρε is a more precise form of οὐροβόρε, referring to the tail-swallowing snake seen in drawings in magical papyri (e.g. PGM vol. II, Pl. I, fig. 4), and regularly on gem amulets.

Ll. 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15: ιω. Cf. S. Eitrem, Papyri Osloenses, fasc. 1, 1925, 38: 'As regards ιω the meanings given by scholars differ widely, some taking it to mean e.g. "moon" (jooh) or "ass" (Copt.) . . . others identifying it with Iaveh. . . . Perhaps it is used here merely as a divine epithet or a liturgically intensifying particle.'

Ll. 10, 13: ἀπερβεθε. This may be a combination of the Hebrew 'aph 'nostril, nose, face, anger,' with a form of the Tetragrammaton, for which see the next note.

Ll. 11, 13, 14: ἀρβαθ Ἰαω and ἀβραθ (by a metathesis common in magical formulae) Ἰαω. Ἰαω is a grecised form of the Hebrew Yahweh. ἀρβαθ probably represents the construct 'arba'ath of 'arbā'āh, the feminine of 'arba', the Hebrew numeral 'four,' with a reference to the Tetragrammaton. See A. Deissmann, Bibelstudien, Marburg, 1895, 3–20, 'Griechische Transkriptionen des Tetragrammaton.' For a different interpretation see T. Hopfner, Griechisch-Ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber, Leipzig, 1921, I, 189, sect. 734.

L. 15: Ἀβρασάξ. See A. Dieterich, Abraxas, Studien zur Religionsgeschichte, Leipzig, 1891, 6, ll. 10–11 (from the Leiden papyrus J. 395): σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐνιαντοῦ Ἀβρασάξ, M. Pieper,

'Die Abraxasgemmen,' Mitt. d. deutsch. Inst. f. Ägypt. Altertumsk. Kairo, V, 1934, 123–43 and H. Leclercq in Cabrol, op. cit., I, 127–55 s.v. Cf. R. Reitzenstein, Poimandres, Studien zur griechisch-ägyptischen und frühchristlichen Literatur, Leipzig, 1904, 272: 'Dass der Name Ἀβρασάξ, weil er aus sieben Buchstaben (στοιχεῖα) besteht, den Gott bezeichnet, der die Macht der sieben Planeten in sich vereinigt, und, weil er den Zahlenwert 365 hat, zugleich ausdrückt, dass in diesem Gott 365 Teilgötter oder Erscheinungsformen vereinigt sind, weiss jeder Philologe.' Cf. also M. Schwab (quoting Chabouillet), 'Vocabulaire de l'angélologie' in Mémoires présentés à l'académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1 série, x, part 2, 383: 'C'est dans les influences des nombres qu'on trouve la raison de ce nom,' and F. Dornseiff, Das Alphabet in Mystik und Magie, (Στοιχεῖα, Heft VII) Leipzig-Berlin, 1925, 42–3, 105.

Ll. 18–19: πάντα . . . ἰσχύν. ἰσχύς is apparently treated as a masculine noun.

L.19: κατέναντι κτλ. These lines may mean 'bind all the herein mentioned persons in respect of all the power they possess against Capetolinus,' or 'bind them in respect of all their power before the face of Capetolinus' i.e. may Capetolinus see them spellbound before his eyes. The κατέναντι of our text would then correspond to ἔνπροσθεν in Youtie and Campbell Bonner, op. cit., 54(6) and 55(22).

EDWARDS AND HUTCHESON

A. OWEN ALDRIDGE

University of Maryland

Although traditionally regarded as an austere clergyman, rigidly circumscribed by narrow doctrinalism, Jonathan Edwards has the distinction of being America's pioneer esthetician. In a Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue he brings together nearly all the theories prevalent in the early eighteenth century concerning the relation of beauty to virtue, and discusses the moral aspects of human passions and conduct. Francis Hutcheson is the philosopher whose influence is most pronounced. In the Dissertation he is mentioned by name three times; the general plan of his theory of moral sense is constantly suggested for comparison, contrast or illustration; fundamental doctrines and corollary principles from his system are specifically stated and attacked; and others of his notions are cited in support of Edwards' own views.[1] It has long been known that Edwards read Hutcheson's work, but the close parallels in his own treatise, making it literally a commentary on Hutcheson, have not been generally recognized. Evidence of the extent of Hutcheson's influence may be found by comparing Edwards' dissertation with his earlier work on The Mind, a discussion of the essence of beauty or harmony in the realms of spirit and of sense. Written while its author was engaged in studying Locke, the discussion contains nearly all of Edwards' original ideas on natural and divine beauty. In the expanded and polished treatise some of the original ideas are modified as a direct result of Hutcheson's concepts, and a complete ethical and aesthetic system is developed to supplant the systems of Hutcheson and other moralists popular at the time. In the earlier work, Edwards bases all esthetic and ethical pleasure on equality and all virtue on love. In the later work, probably because of the influence of Hutcheson, he discards equality as the

[1] Edwards apparently made his initial acquaintance with Hutcheson in excerpts in Ephraim Chambers' Cyclopaedia, 1738 [Thomas H. Johnson, Jonathan Edwards' Background of Reading, Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXVIII (December, 1931), 204,] but since these excerpts are limited to three paragraphs, Edwards undoubtedly later read Hutcheson's Inquiry in toto.

basis of esthetic pleasure, substitutes a formula of uniformity amidst variety, and develops a dichotomy of love of benevolence and love of complacence.

Although most readers are probably familiar with the fundamental characteristics of Hutcheson's system, a cursory summary will be given for reference purposes.[2] It is based on the assumption that there are other senses in the human organism besides the commonly-accepted physical senses. These Hutcheson calls internal senses. Just as we have an external sense of hearing, we also have an internal sense of harmony. Our pleasant ideas arising from the composition of sounds represent harmony, and a sense of harmony or a "good ear" is the power of perceiving this pleasure.[3] The two most important internal senses are the sense of beauty and the moral sense, to each of which Hutcheson devotes a whole treatise. "Beauty" consists of a necessarily pleasant idea raised within us, and a sense of beauty is the power of receiving this idea. The objects which excite our sense of beauty are those in which there is uniformity amidst variety; "where the *Uniformity* of Bodies is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity*." [4] Absolute or primary beauty is found in some "original," an object existing in nature or an established idea; relative beauty is the beauty of an imitation of an original, founded on the conformity between the original and the copy. The sense of beauty is universal among mankind, but there may be differences of opinion concerning the beauty of particular objects because of the diversity of temperament in mankind, the effect of the association of ideas, and the power of custom, education and example.

Esthetic and ethical concepts are inseparable. Just as we have an internal sense of beauty in objects, we have also an internal sense of the goodness or evil of actions, "*a Determination of our Minds to receive the simple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions observ'd, antecedent to any Opinions of Ad-*

[2] For a supplementary account see: Thomas H. Johnson, Jonathan Edwards, Representative Selections (New York, 1935), pp. lxxv–xciii.

[3] An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (5th edition, London, 1753), p. 7.

[4] Ibid., p. 17.

vantage or Loss to redound to our selves from them." [4a] Our perceptions of evil give us a feeling of dislike, and those of good, a feeling of pleasure. Every action which we consider morally good or evil is based upon some affection toward a sensitive nature, and the most common of these affections are ranked under the names of love and hatred. Love toward rational agents, Hutcheson divides into "*Love* of *Complacence*" (approbation of any person by moral sense) and "*Love* of *Benevolence* (a disinterested ultimate desire of the happiness of others). The true spring of virtue is benevolence or "*some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others.*" [5] This benevolence or disinterested affection has a number of manifestations: 1) a calm, extensive affection toward all sentient beings; 2) a calm, deliberate affection toward the happiness of smaller systems taking such forms as patriotism, friendship, domestic affections; 3) the kind passions of love, pity, sympathy and congratulation. Although all these dispositions are benevolent, they have different degrees of moral beauty. "The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures." The second kind is less amiable, but above the third, which though of even a "lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles." [6] Although the affection of benevolence is universal, diversity of moral principles exists in society because of different opinions of what happiness or natural good consists in, because of the diversity of systems to which benevolence is confined, and because of false opinions concerning the deity.[7]

Edwards' discussion of the relation of beauty to virtue, in which he comments on standard eighteenth-century esthetic formulas, develops an original theory of man's epistemological relationship to the world of objects, and analyzes the psychological basis of moral conduct, was designed as a refutation of Hutcheson, or at least as a retracing of Hutcheson's ground from a

[4a] Ibid., p. 129.
[5] Ibid., p. 159.
[6] Ibid., p. 180.
[7] Ibid., pp. 207 ff.

Calvinistic viewpoint. Yet Edwards was subconsciously so sympathetic toward the Hutchesonian concepts of a benevolent universe that he finally went even further than Hutcheson in placing the affections over reason and in visualizing a universe almost pantheistic.

Edwards' True Beauty

Edwards followed Hutcheson in regarding virtue as the highest type of beauty, but unlike Hutcheson his primary interest was in virtue alone (the beauty of qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature) and in the highest type of virtue (true and general beauty of the heart). True virtue, he says, "most essentially consists in BENEVOLENCE TO BEING IN GENERAL. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will." [8] Instead of Hutcheson's three broad classes of benevolence culminating in affection to all sentient beings, Edwards accepts as virtuous only that which is based on a comprehensive disposition to benevolence towards all being. Virtuous benevolence in this sense has only two objects, 1) being simply considered and 2) benevolent being. The first object implies being in general. Benevolence has an ultimate propensity to the highest good of being in general, and it will seek the good of every individual unless this be inconsistent with the highest good of being in general. If being in general be the object of benevolence, that object which has most capacities and powers will receive the greatest share of the propensities of the heart. The second object of a virtuous propensity of the heart is benevolent being, for anyone himself under the influence of general benevolence, seeing another being possessed of the like general benevolence, will feel greater love toward him than to a being possessed of existence alone. Hence on both the primary ground of benevolence and the secondary one of complacence, true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God, "the being who has the greatest share of universal existence" and of "virtuous benevolence." No benevolence to any private system of being may be considered

[8] Works of Jonathan Edwards (London, 1840), I, 122. A Dissertation concerning . . . Virtue was published posthumously in 1765.

virtue unless it rises sensibly from an "exercise of love to God." Actually a "benevolent propensity of heart to being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing," and without this disposition of heart there can be no true virtue. As selfishness or regard to one's own private interest independent of the public good is inimical to the public, no affection toward an object or system more limited than "the great system, comprehending the universality of existence" can be of the nature of true virtue.

It is readily apparent how close this system is to Hutcheson's and yet how remote from it. Edwards is probably referring specifically to Hutcheson when he remarks on the apparent inconsistency in some writers who "do not wholly exclude a regard to the *Deity* out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the *created system*, in such a manner as would naturally lead one to suppose they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme." [9] Hutcheson, in a different work, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, a work which Edwards may not have been aware of, specifically discusses the problem of "How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous," anticipating and refuting Edwards' concept of primary beauty. Men may choose to call nothing virtue, he remarks, but that which is "intended chiefly to evidence *Affection* of one kind or other toward the DEITY," but they must not assert "against universal *Experience*, that we *approve* no Actions which are not thus intended toward the DEITY." [10] Hutcheson affirms that if virtue requires "such sublime Speculations of GOD, as the τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active System*," then "God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute *Incapacity* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very Instincts and natural Affections." Perhaps Edwards would have been inclined to accept this consequence, for it can be reconciled quite easily with his favorite doctrine of original sin. Edwards saw very little virtue in the world,

[9] Ibid., I, 125.
[10] Essay on . . . Passions (3d. ed., London, 1742), pp. 332–33.

and Hutcheson a great deal, primarily because of the respective narrowness and amplitude of their definitions of virtue.

Beauty, Arbitrary or Absolute

Another of Edwards' fundamental departures from Hutcheson's system concerns the nature of man's epistemological relationship to the world of objects, a subject which has direct bearing on the nature of God and the universe. By opposing Hutcheson's theory that the connection between natural objects and a sentiment of beauty is arbitrarily imposed by the creator, Edwards is following a stream of liberal philosophers and theologians stemming from Plato. According to Hutcheson, "There seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the Nature of Things, antecedent to some *Constitution* of the AUTHOR of our Nature." [11] It is quite possible, Hutcheson maintains, that the deity could have formed us so as to receive no immediate pleasure from the regular forms, actions and theorems which we now account beautiful, and pleasure could have been connected to objects of a quite contrary nature.[12] Because of the "sagacious bounty" of the deity, however, our internal senses have been constituted as they are so that we may find pleasure in the most valuable and salutary objects. Beauty is hence arbitrary and relative, for it is possible that one being may find beauty and another being, deformity, in the same relationships. This theory is antithetical to systems which regard beauty as an absolute quality, conforming to an invariable law in nature in consequence of which all rational beings perceive beauty in certain relationships and deformity in the contrary. Plato, Clarke and Shaftesbury were among the philosophers best-known in Edwards' time who regard good, truth and beauty as immutable, eternal and independent of God.

Edwards makes an independent contribution by rejecting the one theory that objects of sense and our idea of beauty are arbitrarily connected, without accepting the other that beauty is an

[11] Inquiry, p. 47.

[12] Ibid., p. 101. For a discussion of the opposing theories of arbitrary and absolute relationships see: A. O. Aldridge, Akenside and the Hierarchy of Beauty, Modern Language Quarterly, VIII (1947), 66–67.

absolute quality independent of the divine will. He agrees with Hutcheson that "the way we come by the idea of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called *beautiful*; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things with which it stands connected; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connexions and consequences." To this extent he has no objection to the view of those who affirm that virtue is founded in sentiment, and not in reason. He rejects their view, however, if they mean that the temper of mind or inward sense given by God "whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea of true virtue, is given *arbitrarily*, so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things." This theory of an arbitrary connection is first of all opposed to Edwards' principle that the essence of virtue (on which beauty depends) consists in agreement or consent of being to being, for it implies that there is nothing in the nature of things to hinder an exactly contrary temper of mind agreeing as well with the nature of things. Edwards calls this an absurdity and a contradiction, for if virtue is an agreement of being to being, a temper of mind agreeing to being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence than would opposition and contrariety to it. Secondly, since God himself is being in general, it is necessary that he agree with himself, and "when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper." Thirdly, created beings can be united to and agree with one another only if they have this temper of mind, for if any particular creature were of a temper opposed to being in general, it would imply universal discord between creatures and their creator and between one another.[13] Finally, any other temper

[13] In this reasoning Edwards seems to imply that even the lower animals have a temper of mind conforming to being in general. Hutcheson had earlier been attacked for implying that brutes could possess virtue, and in the additions to the fourth edition of his Inquiry he admitted that there is something in certain tempers of brutes "so very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I see no harm in calling them Virtue." Edwards' theory that benevolence is based upon the essential nature of God and the nature of things is much more subject to application to animals than is Hutcheson's theory that benevolence is based upon an arbitrary connection. Edwards undoubtedly never intended to construct a system in which brutes could

of mind would lead to individual self-inconsistencies. Every being with understanding and will necessarily loves happiness; otherwise he would not love what is agreeable to him, which is a contradiction. He must therefore "approve of those inclinations whereby beings desire the happiness of being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of being in general." Likewise, "if men loved hatred to being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of *themselves*; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another."

Moral sense, Edwards continues, is also established in agreement with the nature of things and not arbitrarily given because the moral sense "approves the very *same* things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; and those things only; though not on the same *grounds*, nor with the same kind of approbation," and since the divine sense is agreeable to the necessary nature of things, the inferior moral sense must be so also. This theory of an absolute connection between the mind and the nature of things conforms to Edwards' more famous theories of the will. The doctrines of motive influence and divine prescience, on which his determinism is based, assume that all human conduct is governed by a necessary connection between the mind and the nature of things. Some opponents of Edwards' necessitarianism have even asserted that he presupposes absolutes of good and evil in the universe to which even God must conform, a presupposition incompatible with his identification in the Dissertation of divine being with being in general. Edwards may not have realized that his philosophical structure of the will ultimately depends on the doctrine of absolute existence, but it is of some importance for modern students to observe this conformity of the two systems.

Edwards envisages an objection which may be made to his theory of absolute existence: that since sentiment concerning what

---

be considered capable of virtue, but this consequence can be drawn from it. Possibly, to escape this consequence, Edwards would fall back on a formula introduced in his first chapter in which he maintains that a being's degree of existence depends on its greatness or littleness: "An *arch-angel* must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from *non*-entity, than a *worm*." Edwards might affirm, according to this formula, that all creatures could participate in virtue in proportion to their degree of existence. This would contradict a flat statement in Freedom of Will, however, that brute creatures are not moral agents (Part I, Sec. V).

constitutes good and evil in particular actions differs widely among different men and nations, hence vice and virtue must be arbitrary, "not at all determined by the *nature* of things, but by *sentiments* of men with relation to the nature of things." Actually this objection may be levelled just as well against the theory that the connection between the object and the perceiver is arbitrary; indeed it has been previously directed against Hutcheson's theory of beauty and against all ethical and esthetic theories which assert universal standards. Edwards presents two answers to the objection, one borrowed from Hutcheson, that differences of opinion concern only the external manifestations of good and evil, not their basic nature, and second, an original explanation, that faulty semantic sense creates an appearance of diversity which actually does not exist. When thieves or traitors apply odious names to public servants who bring them to justice, or when aggressor nations apply to their attempts at world domination terms signifying the highest degrees of virtue, they are misusing language and are thus inconsistent with themselves.[14] This inconsistency will become apparent if the thieves imagine themselves in the position of those they abuse, or if the aggressor nations put themselves in the position of their victims. In spite of occasional non-conformity or aberrations, therefore, "Mankind in general seem to suppose some *general standard*, or foundation in *nature* for an universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil; which none can depart from but through error and mistake." When Edwards speaks from the pulpit clad in clerical robes, human error and mistake appear as pervasive, ubiquitous forces, but when he enters his study and dons his philosopher's gown, he is able to speak thus lightly of human error and mistake, regarding them as inadequate to change standards implanted by nature. In one character he rejects the Hutchesonian scheme; in the other he finds it congenial and draws upon it as an aid to his own.

Secondary Beauty

Having proved to his own satisfaction that true virtue consists only in general affection or benevolence for being in general and

[14] Here Edwards is subconsciously verging on the doctrine of William Wollaston that vice consists in acting contrary to truth and not treating things as they are.

that any affection falling short of this supreme object is a narrow private affection detached from benevolence to being in general and even in opposition to it, Edwards proceeds to make a distinction between this true virtue which he calls primary beauty and another "inferior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual beings, but is found even in inanimate things; which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c." This is the beauty of geometrical figures, of the colors and figures on a chess board or a piece of brocade, of the parts of a human body or countenance, and of the various notes of a melodious tune, the kind of beauty which Hutcheson describes with his formula of "uniformity in the midst of variety." According to Edwards, this formula describes merely the consent or agreement of different things, in such relations as form and quantity, and means merely that the greater number of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty, for it is "more considerable to have many things consent with one another, than a few only."

Edwards' comments on Hutcheson's formula may be an attempt to reconcile it with his own notion that beauty consists in equality and likeness of ratio, the notion presented in his youthful treatise on The Mind. In his early notes Edwards had taken no notice of variety or the beauty in irregularity. He had specifically declared that "all beauty consists in similarness or identity of relation," a quite different principle from "uniformity in the midst of variety." In his later work, he accepts Hutcheson's formula in an off-hand manner, and with a misleading, if not absolutely mistaken, comment, adds that the "beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use, and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this [uniformity in the midst of variety]." This notion had been widely debated in esthetic theory. Bishop Berkeley had asserted that all beauty observed consists in some use perceived or imagined, establishing this proposition on the ground that we like those forms most which are fittest for use, whereas Hutcheson insists that this principle of utility is quite

different from his formula of uniformity amidst variety.[15] Hutcheson ridicules Berkeley in the additions to the fourth edition of his Inquiry by pointing out that we find beauty only in similitude of parts even though unlike parts would be equally useful. The feet of a chair, for example, if they were of a length, could be of equal utility even though of entirely different shapes, colors or materials. A pillar with "some of the Human Proportions" pleases more than a plain pillar, yet it is not a whit more useful. Hutcheson maintains that there is a sense of proportion and imitation which provides us with pleasure entirely independent of the functional qualities of an object. Edwards does not go quite this far, nor does he take the other extreme that utility alone produces beauty. His explanation is an anticipation of Kant's principle of "adherent beauty." One element of the beauty of proportion and agreement of various things, Edwards observes, is their mutual relation which leads the mind to compare them and to expect and desire agreement. The uniformity of two or more pillars in different places would be less beautiful than the uniformity of pillars in the same building. There is a mental satisfaction from perceiving an agreement between means and an intended effect. The utility of an object is "the proportion and fitness of a cause, or means, to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect suggested to the mind by the idea of the means." This is simple beauty, akin to the beauty in fitting a mortise to its tenon. But when a variety of parts is instrumental in producing a single effect, "as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine," then there is a double beauty, a twofold agreement and uniformity. First, the parts are agreed in a designed end, and, second, through this end the particular parts agree with and are united to one another. In this way, Edwards demonstrates an organic relationship between the principle of utility or commodity and Hutcheson's formula of uniformity amidst variety.[16]

[15] Alciphron, The Third Dialogue, A. C. Frazer, ed., The Works of George Berkeley, D.D. (Oxford, 1871), II, 118–24.

[16] Edwards makes no distinction between the esthetic and the intellectual whereas Kant clearly describes the pleasure in perceiving an end or purpose as a combination of an intellectual and an esthetic delight. Kant makes a distinction between pure or free beauty and beauty which is dependent on a concept of what the object should be and an answering perfection of the object. The beauty of

Edwards is careful to show that although mutual agreement and proportion are the basis of the law by which beautiful objects give pleasure, many men still experience pleasure from secondary beauty without in the least perceiving the basic agreement and proportion. A man may, for example, be pleased with the notes in a tune without understanding the laws of harmony and physics, without knowing of the vibrations in the air and in the auditory mechanism. Also a man may be pleased with the beautiful proportion in a face without understanding the elements of that proportion.[17] This is not contradictory of Edwards' denial, already discussed, that the connection between the beauty of virtue and our delight in it is arbitrary. Edwards distinguishes the two concepts in his final chapter: "they who see the beauty of true virtue do not perceive it by argumentation on its connexions and consequences, but by the *frame of their own minds* . . . whereby they immediately perceive pleasure"; nevertheless it still is not true that the inward sense or frame of their minds "is given *arbitrarily*," so that if God had pleased "he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things." [18]

Stated in the abstract, Edwards' next principle that the secondary beauty of uniformity and proportion is found in immaterial as well as material things, seems innocuous enough. Yet it is not introduced as an esthetic concept, but is used as a means of overthrowing the ethical systems of Hutcheson and other moralists. Edwards discredits their systems by the simple process of characterizing them as founded on uniformity and proportion (secondary beauty), but not on virtue (primary beauty). The beauty of

---

animals and buildings which is of the second type, "presupposes a concept of the end that defines what the thing has to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; and is therefore merely appendant beauty." (J. C. Meredith, trans., Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement [Oxford, 1911], p. 73.) Kant would say with Hutcheson that beauty has no essential relation to utility, and with Edwards that an intellectual perception of an end may increase the sensation of delight or satisfaction of the perceiver.

[17] Hutcheson was fully aware of this principle, for he says of the pleasure from beauty that "We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's *Taste* may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the small Bodies, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him." Inquiry, p. 29.

[18] Works, I, 141.

an orderly society consists in the regular functioning of each member in an office or station determined by his capacities and talents, a beauty of the same kind as the regularity of a beautiful building in which the pillars, panels, cornices and partitions are stationed in their appointed places. The formula of uniformity amidst variety fits a well-ordered society as closely as it does the beauty of wisdom, "the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose," a quality quite distinct from benevolence or goodness. Even the quality in justice consisting in "the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and measure" is of the same nature as the secondary beauty of material things.[19] It is no more true virtue to relish uniformity and proportion among spiritual things than to approve the harmony of music or the beauty of a geometrical figure. Experience plainly shows that the approbation of this kind of beauty has no connection with virtue. Otherwise the "delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons, in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd." Here Edwards is hitting at the Platonizing of Shaftesbury, and to a lesser degree, Hutcheson. An interpretation of Shaftesbury's ethics is beyond the province of the present discussion, but it may be said that Shaftesbury makes no clear distinction between a sense of beauty and sense of virtue and definitely states that the discernment of natural beauty in figures is the same is discernment of natural beauty in actions, that beauty and good are identical.[20] Edwards in answer to such notions asserts that a relish of beautiful figures, proportions and colors has no more dependence on general benevolence than loving the taste of honey or the smell of a rose. By demonstrating that principles of justice or proportion are actually principles of esthetics, an approximation of a fundamental Shaftesburian notion, Edwards sends the whole Hutchesonian scheme boomeranging back against its author.

[19] Ibid., I, 129.
[20] J. M. Robertson ed., Characteristics (London, 1900), II, 137–38.

Self-Love

In his next section on self-love, he uses a similar method — demonstrating that opposing ethical systems, presumably based on social love, are actually based on the inferior principle of self-love, and that the principle of justice may be approved on the ground of self-love as well as on the ground of uniformity and proportion. The common examples of conduct cited by Hutcheson and his disciples as illustrations of moral sense and benevolence Edwards resolves into the disposition of the mind to be pleased with beauty and to dislike the contrary deformity.

One of Hutcheson's proofs of the existence of moral sense is based on the difference between our feelings toward inanimate beings and those toward rational agents. We feel love and esteem toward a generous friend or any noble character, but toward a fruitful field or comfortable dwelling (which may be just as advantageous to us) we feel only a desire of possession or a cold recognition of our interest being served.[21] If we reap from two men an equal advantage, one serving us from delight in our happiness and the other from views of self-interest or constraint, we have entirely different perceptions of the two men through moral sense, warm affection toward one and indifference toward the other. Our attitude toward evil done to us also reveals moral sense. If we had merely the sense of natural good and evil alone, "*Villany*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resented as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an overflowing Stream." Because of moral sense, however, we feel contempt, indignation and anger toward human beings who serve us ill, but have no emotional antagonisms toward objects or forces in nature. Edwards uses Hutcheson's phrases in reporting this argument that only moral sense can explain our affections toward moral agents. "Otherwise, why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We are very differently affected towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will." In his refutation which

[21] Inquiry, pp. 111 ff.

follows, Edwards argues that one could just as well point out how differently we are

> affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and public motive, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public by destroying the fruits of the earth.

This is one of the most ambiguous sections of a treatise not noted for perspicuity. Edwards means merely that it is obvious that our feelings toward human beings and toward inanimate objects are different regardless of whether they are based upon self-love or social. Here Edwards may justly be accused of sophistry, for he is condemning a chain of reasoning for inadequately supporting a conclusion it was never intended to reach. Hutcheson had used the distinction between ill from nature and ill from men to show that the mere existence of affections presupposes an antecedent discriminatory moral sense. Edwards assumes that the distinction is used to show that the affections cannot be a result of self-love. Hutcheson's argument may not be a good one and his reasoning may not be sound, but Edwards does not refute it. He does not even meet it.

Edwards next shows that anger and gratitude have in them no element of public affection or benevolence, the quality which the advocates of moral sense regard as the foundation of true virtue. A ship's crew, for example, plan to mutiny, murder the captain, and turn pirates, but one of their number, repenting, reveals the plot, informs, and the others are brought to justice. They feel intense anger, but it is by no means an affection based on regard for the public welfare. Similarly, a gang of robbers, about to be captured at their place of rendezvous, is warned in time by an outside person. The robbers are so thankful that they reward him with money. They feel gratitude, but public good, benevolence and moral sense have nothing to do with the affair. The passion of anger in particular, Edwards continues, is an unlucky choice as a proof of natural benevolence. One would expect, if anger arises from a relish of the beauty of benevolence, that a disposition

toward anger should increase as a man has more of a benevolent temper, whereas experience shows that the less men have of benevolence, the more they are disposed to anger.[22] Although the parallel affection of gratitude may be on some occasions a truly virtuous principle, not all gratitude, any more than all anger, arises from a truly virtuous principle of heart.

Another of Hutcheson's proofs of moral sense is based on our esteem for actions and characters either remote in time and place or entirely fictitious, conduct and persons with whom self-interest cannot be connected. The advocates of self-love, he asserts, may explain that we love or hate these characters according as we feel they would deal with us were we in a similar situation, but the obvious answer is "that had we no Sense of *moral Good* in Humanity, *Mercy*, *Faithfulness*, why should not Self-Love and our Sense of *natural Good* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful Tyrant, or Traitor?" Hutcheson had sarcastically suggested that it is only by twisting self-love into a thousand shapes that the proponents of the selfish system arrive at their principle that we approve in books actions tending to the good of the whole because we realize that they are ultimately of advantage to ourselves. Edwards challenges this representation that "there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining to make it out, that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage." He compares our feelings toward characters in fiction or history to a child's aversion or disgust on seeing a picture of a rattlesnake or his feeling of delight on seeing a picture of succulent fruit. Although the child neither fears the bite of the pictured snake, nor expects to eat the pictured fruit, his approbation or disgust "may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasure of *taste* and *hearing*, and its aversion to *pain* and

[22] Hutcheson's treatise may have been the source of these remarks on anger, but Edwards may have known also the more extreme positions of Shaftesbury and Butler that anger is in part a positive indication of the operation of moral sense. Butler even suggests that anger is one of the bonds of society. W. E. Gladstone ed., Sermons (Oxford, 1897), p. 119. Elsewhere in his dissertation (Chapter VII) Edwards proves that gratitude is improperly considered to be a virtue, a view which influenced Godwin. See: A. O. Aldridge, Jonathan Edwards and William Godwin on Virtue, American Literature, XVIII (1947), 308–18.

death, through *self-love*," associated in its mind with pictorial representations.

Natural Instincts

Edwards' position on self-love is difficult to define with exactitude. He is too much persuaded by Hutcheson's theory of the benevolent passions to adopt the position of Hobbes and Mandeville that all conduct is ultimately selfish. (Nowhere does he deny that some gratitude and some anger may be motivated by true virtue.) Yet he cannot afford to accept Hutcheson's system because of the relatively subordinate position asigned in it to the deity and because any vindication of human benevolence indirectly challenges the doctrine of original sin. Hence he admits the salutary influence of particular acts of altruism, but is unwilling to admit that man's nature can rise to absolute benevolence. In his chapter on particular instincts of nature, Edwards isolates Hutcheson's three strongest proofs of benevolence in mankind and demonstrates that each one falls short of true virtue, agreeing for the most part with Hutcheson's psychological analyses, but drawing different conclusions from them as he fits them into his own scheme. He agrees that there is in parental love and sexual love a natural disposition to mutual benevolence and complacence apart from inclination to sensitive pleasure or narrow self-love, but adds his formula that since this disposition arises from an instinct or particular law of nature, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Then he considers the affection of pity or compassion, which Hutcheson and most moralists stressing social affections had regarded as one of the strongest proofs of a natural disposition "to study the *Interest* of others without any Views of *private Advantage*." Every mortal is made uneasy, Hutcheson affirms, by any grievous misery he sees another involved in,[23] and he desires to effect the relief of this misery "without any imagination that this Relief is a *private Good*" to himself. So powerful is this kind instinct of nature that people rush to see objects of compassion, for example, public executions, gladiatorial contests, and tragedies, and thereby voluntarily expose themselves to pain. Here again

[23] Inquiry, p. 243.

Edwards accepts Hutcheson's principles to a limited degree, admitting the existence of pity as a natural instinct, but insisting that the disposition to pity does not arise from the truly virtuous principle of general benevolence. If pity was so grounded, Edwards argues, then "they who are the subjects of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness, of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress." Yet his condition does not prevail universally. Many who are moved with pity at the anguish of others would not be at all affected if they heard that the same persons were dead; many who would be moved by seeing the torments of a brute-creature are not moved by the knowledge that thousands of such creatures die every day; and "persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about." Indeed, Edwards continues, not only may pity exist without benevolence, but it may consist with true malevolence. Men may pity others under exquisite torment whom they would have been aggrieved to see prosperous or they may even feel compassion for others in torment whom they would be glad to see dead. "For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object." These examples prove, Edwards concludes, that pity is not of the nature of true benevolence, "but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted, chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well being." God has designed the exercise of pity to extend beyond our immediate acquaintance to all those in extreme calamity because men in such circumstances commonly need the help of others besides their friends and because without relief their destruction might take place. Men were not given an instinctive joy in others' prosperity as great as their instinctive grief at others' extreme calamity "because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation." The presence of pity in the present world is evidence for Edwards that in spite of the prevailing sinfulness, this is not a world of punishment.

Despite this evangelical note and the recurring motif of original

sin, there is much in Edwards' treatise which gives the impression that Edwards was not only drawn toward Hutcheson's theories of benevolence, but that he subconsciously went beyond them to a much more radical concept of God. Edwards may have associated love to being in general with love to the three persons of the Trinity in conformity with orthodox belief, but his emphasis on the system and its beauty suggests that at the time he wrote his dissertation he considered God as part of the system, not as a motivating force above and independent of it. Throughout his dissertation Edwards controverts particular aspects of Hutcheson's scheme of the benevolent affections, yet in his concluding paragraphs he reaches an estimate much like Hutcheson's concerning the universal prevalence in humanity of a sense of the foundation of moral good and evil. When Edwards is criticizing Hutcheson he speaks as a realist who sees men as they are. When presenting his own theory, however, his practical experience seems to desert him and he ascends to a height of abstract theory not quite in touch with the real world. Edwards' system is in general logical, but logical primarily because it is beyond the realm of reality. It is not likely that many people will become better men through reading Edwards' treatise, although they may become more richly endowed with ethical concepts.

PHOEBE'S LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

In a recent issue of the Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, in Manchester (XXI, 1948, pp. 224–40), Professor T. W. Manson writes of "St. Paul's Letter to the Romans — and Others," arguing that Paul must have sent what we know as Romans out in two forms, one, our chapters 1–15, to Rome; the other, the same, with the addition of chapter 16, which would introduce Phoebe, to the church at Ephesus. Professor Manson is of course well aware of the perplexing problem of the rightful place of the great doxology, 16:25–27, which some manuscripts place at the end of chapter 14, most at the end of chapter 16, but the oldest manuscript, the P^{46}, a papyrus from the early third century, places at the end of chapter 15. This location is in striking accord with the internal evidence, and confirms the theory advanced by David Schulz, more than a hundred years ago, that chapter 16 is no part of Romans, but part of a separate letter to Ephesus. Professor Dodd, however, concludes that chapter 16 is an integral part of the Letter to the Romans, inasmuch as "the burden of proof rests upon those who would set aside the tradition in favor of the conjecture," p. 237.

But what *is* the tradition? We have seen that there are three different textual traditions as to the rightful place of the great doxology, a fact which certainly shakes the tradition, especially as scholars have long felt its inappropriateness at the end of chapter 16. The testimony of P^{46}, an important item in the tradition, strongly suggests that the Letter to Rome ended with chapter 15, capped with the doxology, and that chapter 16 may perhaps be another letter altogether.

This is at once strongly confirmed by the character and contents of that chapter. The inclusion of Aquila and Prisca among the persons saluted, and foremost among them, at once suggests Ephesus as the letter's destination, for it is there we would expect to find them; they had been last heard of there.

The next person greeted is Epaenetus, the first man converted at Ephesus. We would naturally expect to meet him there, rather than at Rome; we do not know that he ever visited Rome. Paul's large acquaintance with men and women in the church to which Phoebe is going, their family groupings, domestic arrangements, and Christian records, fits very badly with Rome, where Paul has never been, but perfectly well with Ephesus where he has just spent almost three years. It is also far

more natural for Paul to introduce Phoebe to people he knows than to people to most of whom he is known only by name and reputation.

Manson is impressed with what he calls the acid comment of Lietzmann on the theory that Romans 16 is a letter to Ephesus: "A letter consisting almost entirely of nothing but greetings . . . is a monstrosity." But had Lietzmann never carried a letter of introduction? Had he never written one? Such a letter is no place for a religious lecture. But in a letter introducing a Christian woman to a church on the other side of the Aegean, they are not inappropriate, indeed they may be very much in order.

The Roman world was a bad and brutal world, and inns were notoriously likely to be no places for a decent woman, particularly a Christian woman, to put up in. To commend Phoebe to the church at Ephesus was one thing. But it was not enough for the practical situation. Friends must be found for Phoebe in Ephesus who will take her into their houses with true Christian hospitality. By these numerous greetings, Paul in effect introduces Phoebe personally to each of these family circles, a most important service, if she is to be made safe and comfortable in Ephesus. Particularly the women mentioned, with the account of their family circles, might lead to Phoebe's entertainment in more than one of them. These scholars seem to have lost sight of the fact that Phoebe needs more than a place to go to church in Ephesus. Even if these Christian family groups cannot entertain Phoebe, they can certainly find a safe and respectable place for her to board while in Ephesus.

Thus understood, this long line of greetings to Christian people in Ephesus, so far from being a "monstrosity," is very much to the purpose indeed! It is in fact just what Phoebe needs most — a list of Christian people in Ephesus to whom she can appeal for direction and assistance, and even hospitality. Perhaps Prisca and Aquila will take her in; they had done as much for Paul. Perhaps Rufus' mother will look after her; she had been a mother to Paul. It is striking how many household groups Paul mentions. But of course! What Phoebe needs is an invitation to some Christian home in Ephesus. And this is precisely what Paul's long list of his friends there provides. Not that the letter is to her; but it is bound to interest twenty-eight people or groups of people at Ephesus in looking after Phoebe on or soon after her arrival there.

If we are to understand this letter, Romans 16, we must try to realize the position of a Christian woman trying to travel about the ancient Rome world alone. Paul's generous and well-considered effort to assist her shows that he did not disapprove of her journey, and that he knew

the difficulties she would have to meet, and saw perfectly clearly how Christian hospitality would enable her to surmount them. As ancient letters of introduction go (and there are many examples in the papyri), Romans 16 is not a short letter but a long one. The list of names is not a monstrosity but an essential part of the communication. As Paul has only recently left Ephesus, the instruction, vss.17–20, is brief and incidental; what can he add to what he has already said to them during his stay of almost three years among them in Ephesus?

And if as I have long sought to show, the Pauline corpus was first assembled in the circle of Ephesus (the churches of Asia, — Colossae, Laodicea), it would be very natural not to omit from it their own letter from Paul, too short to stand alone, but as an appendix to the great Letter to Rome, written from the same place, at the same time. Philemon might be included as a unit, as Paul to the Laodiceans, but to present Romans 16 as "Paul to the Ephesians" would hardly do justice to the great Ephesian church, the foremost of all the churches, when the first collection of Paul's letters was made, and as Harnack called it, the second fulcrum of Christianity. The loss of its opening salutation is natural enough, in the light of the treatment of the Corinthian letters, two of which have so clearly been combined into one, simply by omitting the address and salutation of one of them.

Edgar J. Goodspeed

Los Angeles, California.

A BLOOD-STAUNCHING AMULET

It was not without trepidation that I set out to supplement and slightly to correct the discussion of an amulet by that expert on the subject Professor Campbell Bonner, whose excellent book [1] has recently come into my hands. Among the many curious specimens contained therein is one which is listed as D 144 and figured on Plate VII, described on p. 276 and discussed on pp. 87–89. It has on the obverse a pterygoma, that is to say an inscription written first in full, then without its first letter, then without its first two letters and so on, thus forming a conventional wing. In the space left by the tapering of this is shown a warrior in full equipment, who may or may not be Ares. Above him is a thunderbolt. On the reverse is a curious erection, perhaps a very oddly formed altar, above which is something like a jar, in the shape of a recurrent object on some of these amulets, which Bonner, plausibly at least and probably rightly, interprets as the human uterus, but in an unusual position, for its neck (the os uteri?) is turned upwards, not, as commonly, downwards. On either side is a snake, above "a disk with eight radii — whether a wheel or a conventional sun is uncertain." [2] Around the margin runs some magic jargon ending in "Sabaoth."

I quite agree with the learned author that this amulet was meant to cure some kind of haemorrhage, whether menorrhagia or not.[3] My purpose is merely to show that the case for this interpretation could be made stronger. The wearer suffers from too much blood in the wrong place and wants to be rid of it. The natural counter-magic is to suggest the cessation of the unwelcome flow, and this, I think, is the one and only significance of all the carvings. I suppose that the vessel, be it a uterus or simply a jar, is to be thought of as full of blood. It is shown on its stand, conceivably an altar whose fire could boil it dry, but no fire is to be seen, so I would not insist on this point. But on either side is a serpent, and that is a notoriously thirsty creature, see for instance Juvenal, Sat. vi, 431, where a thirsty woman tamquam alta in dolia longus deciderit serpens bibit et uomit.[4]

[1] Campbell Bonner, Studies in Magical Amulets, Ann Arbor, 1950.

[2] Bonner, op. cit., p. 88.

[3] Ibid., p. 89.

[4] I am not sure that serpens is "a" snake; it may be "the" snake, which according to Gregory of Tours (Hist. Franc. IV, 9) had an adventure very like

Also, one kind of snake, the haemorrhois, makes those whom it bites bleed to death.[5] Above is what may be (I think it is) a conventionalised sun, fit to dry up the undesirable moisture. On the other side of the gem we have the inscription already mentioned, which I read a little differently from Bonner and his predecessor Seyrig. There is no doubt about the letters; in full, they run thus: ΔΙΨΑΣΤΑΝΤΑΛΕ ΑΙΜΑΙΙΙΕ. The difficulty and, as I hold, the misinterpretation lie in the first five, which have been taken to be the noun, whether substantive or adjective, διψάς. But if it be the substantive (Bonner), the construction is strange, if the adjective (Seyrig), it is feminine whereas it should be masculine. I read it as διψᾷς[6] and render, "Are you thirsty, Tantalos?" (or, "T., you are thirsty," according as we put a question-mark or a colon after the vocative), "(then) drink blood." The rest of the obverse shows a warrior, that is one ἄπλητον αἵματος, like Cyrus in Herodotos,[7] and a thunderbolt, one of the effects of which is that dolia exhauriuntur intactis operimentis nulloque alio uestigio relicto,[8] from which it may reasonably (or reasonably enough for a magician) be concluded that it is a thirsty thing. Thus the flow of blood is assailed by a thirsty creature, the thirsty sun, possibly a thirsty fire, the thirstiest person in mythology the magician can think of, a blood-thirsty soldier and a thirsty thunderbolt. If these will not make it dry up, nothing will.

HERBERT JENNINGS ROSE

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

---

that of the fox in Horace, Epp. I, 7, 29 sqq. But we do not know that Gregory had this fable from an ancient source and the scholiast on Juvenal refers to nothing of the kind.

[5] Lucan, IX, 806 sqq.

[6] For this late conjugation of διψῆν, see Veitch and Liddell-Scott-Jones s.u.; the dropping of an iota adscript is nothing remarkable in late Greek.

[7] Herodotos, I, 212, 2, 3.

[8] Pliny, N.H. II, 137.

THE ANGUIPEDE OF THE MAGICAL AMULETS

With his Studies in Magical Amulets Professor Campbell Bonner has rendered a great service not only to collectors and museums, but also to the history of religion in Late Antiquity. His sound criticism has removed over-hasty interpretations, especially those which have given the name of "gnostic gems" to those amulets of which he writes. He says somewhere that his criticism will lessen the religious interest in the gems. But there is a great truth in his words: "Nothing is more important in these studies than to recognize the limits of our knowledge" (p. 195). If this is properly done we have firm ground to stand upon and are able to appreciate the value and importance of these monuments for the religious mind of Late Antiquity. The rivalry with the magic papyri is evident, but while these were the property of specialists, magical technicians, the amulets teach us what was current among the people.

However, I do not want to enlarge upon the rich contents of the book, but rather to take up a single point, the interpretation of which I hope to be able to further somewhat. I refer to one of the commonest types of magical amulets, the god with a cock's head, with snakes instead of legs, and clad in Roman military costume. I agree with Professor Campbell Bonner that the cock's head denotes him as a god of the Sun, of the Light, of the Heaven.[1] In the age under discussion foreign gods, Egyptian, Syrian, etc., appear frequently in Roman military costume.[2] So, for example, a bronze statuette represents Sarapis in the costume of the Imperator with the globe in his left hand, a spear in his right; on his head are traces of the disc of the sun.[3] He is the god who rules the world. The best known example is the Syrian god Jupiter Dolichenus. The soldiers were wont to pay cult to gods in military costume, their emperors, and the people of the provinces worshipped the emperors for

[1] K. Heisig, "Das geistliche Morgenlied von Fleury: ein Mithras-hymnus," Zeitschrift f. Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, II, 1949–50, p. 222, adduces many passages showing this. I cannot accept his conclusion that this medieval hymn is a Mithraic liturgy. The instances referred to are not specifically Mithraic and the name of Mithras is introduced by a conjecture. I may also point to A. Alföldi, "Der iranische Weltriese auf archäologischen Denkmälern," Jahrbuch der schweizerischen Gesellschaft f. Urgeschichte, XL, 1949–50, p. 25, who treats of the cock in the cosmogonic myths of the Indo-Iranian tribes, especially the cock-horse.

[2] Some more instances are found in my paper: "Zur Deutung der Jupiter-Giganten-Säulen, "Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft, XXIII, 1925, p. 175. I refer especially to R. Paribeni, "Divinità stranieri in abito militare romano," Bulletin de la société archéologique d'Alexandrie, XIII, 1911, p. 177.

[3] E. Breccia, "Osiris-Apis in abito militare romano," l. c. XVII, 1919–20, p. 184.

they knew that the overwhelming power of the Romans depended on their weapons, and so they clad their gods in the Roman military costume to express their power. For the anguipedes Professor Campbell Bonner refers to Pergamene and Syrian sculptures representing such giants, etc., but his discussion is not conclusive. There must be some deeper meaning in this monstrous form.

I recall sculptural groups, from a distant region, but of the same age: the riding god — not the emperor, as is sometimes said, but probably a Celtic god — clad in military costume, supported by an anguipede giant, at the top of a high column. These monuments, the so-called Jupiter-Giant-columns, are found in the districts around the middle Rhine and belong, as far as they are dated, to the early part of the third century A.D. They have been much discussed and variously interpreted, but I believe that the interpretation of them in terms of a cosmic symbolism set forth in my paper quoted in note 2 is sound. Such a symbolism is manifest in the representation crowning a famous monument from the same country and the same age, the Igel Column near Trier. It is egg-shaped, surmounted by the eagle of Jupiter carrying Ganymede upwards, placed between four female heads with flowing locks, Oceanides, and on a square capital on the corners of which are anguipede giants whose legs cover the sides. This is no doubt a symbolical representation of the cosmic egg with the heavens, the ocean and the Underworld.[4] The group which crowns the Jupiter-Giant-columns expresses the same cosmic symbolism in an abridged form. The god is the highest god, the god of Heaven, the giant symbolizes the Underworld. The whole group represents a cosmic, all-embracing god who holds sway over the Upper and Nether Worlds. Of course, these monuments found in a far-off country do not prove much, but the clue thus indicated may be worth considering more closely.

The cosmic, all-embracing god was a dominating idea in the religious mind of Late Antiquity. Professor Festugière has expounded the origin and the history of this god in an important book.[5] Such an all-embracing god may appear in other forms familiar to the magical amulets. Helios may pose as such an one,[6] and there is too an Egyptianizing pantheistic god.[7] Most remarkable is a gem in Toronto which shows a tendency to endow the Lord of the Dead (Osiris) with solar attributes.[8]

[4] See my paper quoted note 2, p. 180. The same interpretation is given by Mrs. A. Strong, Apotheosis and After Life, p. 229.

[5] A. J. Festugière, La revélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, II, Le dieu cosmique.

[6] Campbell Bonner, Studies in Magical Amulets, p. 148.

[7] L. c., p. 156.

[8] L. c., p. 149.

For the dominating position of the cosmic god, the Lord of the Universe, in Late Antiquity I need only refer to the pseudo-Aristotelian tractate on the Universe and to the Hermetic writings. In the magic papyri he comes more often to the fore than other gods and is invoked with long hymns. Sometimes he is nameless, more often he is given names of other gods (Helios, Aion); even the "Headless one" is so represented.[9] Certainly the cosmic god is seldom [10] invoked as the god of the Nether World and the Dead. This is understandable, for his origin is to be found in philosophy and science, and to educated people the stories of the Underword were old wives' tales, "fabulaeque Manes," as Horace says. But in the self-predication of Isis in Apuleius [11] in which she claims to be omnipotent, she claims also the lordship of the Underworld and the Dead. Whatever the intellectuals may have said and thought the people kept steadily to the old belief in the Nether World and its power;[12] they could not imagine an all-embracing, omnipotent god who was not at the same time the Lord of the Underworld. Such a god could protect the wearer of an amulet. Thus it seems probable that the cock-headed god of the magical amulets has his snaky legs to denote him as the god of the Nether World, just as the cock's head shows him to be the god of the Sun, the Light, and the Heaven, and his military costume the Lord of Human Life.

It is frequently said that the snake is a chthonic animal representing the Dead, but it is hardly probable that this is the reason why the cosmic god should be represented as an anguipede. More probably the reason for it is found in the common art type of the anguipede giants of whom Professor Campbell Bonner mentions some examples. The giants were sons of the Earth, they lay buried beneath certain mountains, there are many stories of the bones of giants being found. The giants were prominent in myth and folk-tales and known through many works of art as representatives of the Underworld.

Thus I think that we have to understand the cock-headed anguipede in military costume as the all-embracing, omnipotent cosmic god, Lord of the Sun, the Light, the Heaven, of Human Life, and of the Underworld, comprising the entire Universe of popular belief. His popularity in magical amulets corresponds to the popularity of the cosmic god in the magic papyri.

[9] See my paper "Die Religion in den griechischen Zauberpapyri," Bulletin de la société des lettres de Lund, 1947–48, II, p. 21.

[10] Papyri graecae magicae, ed. Preisendanz, IV, l. 2199.

[11] Apuleius, Metam., XI, 5.

[12] See my Geschichte der griechischen Religion, II, p. 520.

Professor Campbell Bonner does not attach great weight to the fact that the name Iao is often inscribed on the shield of the anguipede. He may be right, for the name of the Jewish god is used in the magic papyri chiefly as a magical word; only once is he said to be the creator of the world.[13] But it is significant that the name is so constantly added to the anguipede. Another name, Abrasax, appears fairly often on these amulets. As is commonly known it is the number of the days of the year, 365. It ought to be added that in this kind of numerical speculation, starting from a chronological standpoint the year is the highest numerical entity, fitted to denote the highest god. I do not speak of the twelve months, the twelve signs of the zodiac, or of the seven days of the week and their gods, but might call attention to the doctrine of the Gnostic system of Valentinianus, according to which there are fifteen pairs of aeons, in all 30, that is to say the number of the days of the month. This is probably not an invention of Valentinianus'; it fits in with the speculations on the chronological periods at the head of which is Abrasax.

MARTIN P. NILSSON

Lund University
SWEDEN

[13] Papyri graecae magicae, VII, l. 759.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BIBLE AND THE WORLD. *By Apostolos Makrakis.* Chicago, Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1950. 478, 32 p.

THE CHRIST OF THE CROSS. *By Richard Morgan.* New York, Richard R. Smith, 1950. 285 p. $3.50.

DESIGN FOR LIVING. *By Esther Rudy.* N. Y., Bloch Publishing Company, 1950. 224 p. $3.00.

DIEU. Son existence et sa nature. *Par R. Garrigou-Lagrange.* Paris, Beauchesne, 1950. 342 p.

DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. *By Hughell E. W. Fosbroke.* Evanston, Ill., Seabury Western Theological Seminary, 1950. 26 p.

ENSAYOS SOBRE EL RENACIMIENTO ITALIANO. *Por Rodolfo Mondolfo.* Tucuman, Argentina, Universidad Nacional de Tucuman, 1950. 61 p.

THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUL IN THE MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY. *By Philip David Bookstaber.* Philadelphia, Maurice Jacobs, 1950. 104 p. $2.00.

EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS. *By H. G. Meecham.* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1949. xii, 165 p. 18/.

L'EPITRE AUX HEBREUX. *Traduite par C. Spicq.* (La Sainte Bible traduite en francais sous la direction de l'Ecole de Jérusalem.) Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1950. 76 p.

GESCHICHTE ISRAELS. *Von Martin Noth.* Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1950. VII, 395 p.

HET HART (LEB, LEBAB) IN HET OUDE TESTAMENT. (with a summary in English). *Door Frederik Hendrik Von Meyenfeldt.* Leiden, Brill, 1950. xvi, 225 p.

INAUGURAL LECTURES DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY. *Edited by A. S. Peake.* Manchester at the University Press, 1905. xii, 296, xvi p.

LE JUDAISME PALESTINIEN AU TEMPS DE JESUS-CHRIST. *Par Joseph Bonsirven.* Paris, Beauchesne, 1950. 250 p.

KREUZESWISSENSCHAFT. *By Edith Stein.* Edith Steins Werke, I. Louvain, Editions Nauwelaerts, 1950. xi, 300 p.

LE LIVRE DE JOB. *Traduit par R. P. Larcher.* (La Sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de l'Ecole de Jérusalem). Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1950. 169 p.

DIE NACHGESICHTE DES SACHARJA. *Von Lars Gösta Rignell.* Lund, Gleerups, 1950. 268 p.

THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. *By John Murphy.* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1949. vii, 451 p. 25/.

AN ORTHODOX-PROTESTANT DEBATE. *By Denver Cummings.* Chicago, Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1949. 74, 12 p.

LES PSAUMES. *Traduits par R. Tournay.* (La Sainte Bible traduite en français sous la direction de l'Ecole Biblique de Jérusalem). Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1950. 480 p.

THE TRIAL OF JESUS CHRIST. *By Aristarchus Vassilakos.* Chicago, Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1950. 64 p.

THE TWO CONTRARIANT SCHOOLS. *By Apostolos Makrakis.* Chicago, Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1949. 87 p.

L'UNION DE GRACE SELON SAINT THOMAS. *Par Robert Morency.* Montréal, Editions de l'Immaculée-Conception, 1950. 287 p.